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ABSTRACT 
 
 Candide calls into question its merit as literature or philosophy because it draws its reader 
into eisegesis. The act of interpreting Candide is never a cool judgment. The enigmatic ending 
forces the reader to see that acts of judgment are appetitive: Desires shape judgment; judgment 
plies desire. Candide’s behavior reveals eighteenth century interest in “the body,” which was the 
scientist’s chief tool in entering “the void” to explore the integrity of new knowledge. We see 
this body interest in Locke’s Essay and, through a concept of “hesitation,” we can see that 
Voltaire absorbed Lock’s view of the interconnection between judgment and appetite. Candide 
teaches us to be aware of this relationship (i.e., we learn to hesitate). Interestingly, many modern 
scholars interpret Candide’s hesitation in accordance with Rousseau’s anthropology. Whether 
this is right or wrong, Candide does begin an exploration of humanity’s place in “the void” and, 
in so doing, an investigation into human nature itself. However we define “human nature” we 
must inevitably deal with the question Candide himself asks: “Why was anything created?” By 
dealing with this question—whether we reject its metaphysical trajectory or not—we reveal our 
appetites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 It has been said that Candide causes paranoia in its critics.1 This is because Candide 
draws its readers into confession. Candide draws out the reader’s testimony even as the reader 
seeks to draw out the text’s meaning. Exegesis inevitably becomes eisegesis and, therefore, the 
text causes paranoia for a critic’s job is to be critical not narcissistic. The difficulty occurs 
because Voltaire, following Locke, portrayed a world in which judgment and volition 
interconnect. To judge the text is to reveal one’s own will. For Locke the will is shaped 
according to its appetites and seeks to obtain a possible good, in judging the text, a reader reveals 
what she perceives to be good (i.e. what she desires). In Candide, judgment molds desire and 
desire plies judgment. We argue for what we perceive to be good, and in this way we reveal our 
own testimonies. By drawing out testimony instead of proving a point, Candide plays a game 
with its readers and, in doing so, calls into question its own seriousness as a philosophical and 
literary work.  
One will ask: “Is Candide’s eisegesis ‘old-fashioned’ irrationalism?” Or, “Is Voltaire 
‘holding reason suspect’ by caricaturing Leibniz?”  Or, again, “Does Candide’s clandestine 
behavior mean it plays an ‘irresponsible game’ instead of participating responsibly in serious 
science?”2  
                                                 
1
 Douglas Bonneville, Voltaire and the Form of the Novel (Oxford: the Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor 
Institute, 1976), 128. He writes that critics of Candide must be “self-conscious to the point of paranoia.” 
J. G. Weightman, “The Quality of Candide,” Candide: The Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton and 
Company Press, 1966), 159. Weightman writes that Candide “is a parable of an aspect of the human plight. It is a 
pilgram’s progress, only this pilgram can find no meaning in life nor establish any relationship with the 
transcendent.” Critics become paranoid because Candide challenges our own systems of judgment. When we try to 
interpret the tale, we are drawn into observing our human plight and it is this plight the story teaches us about. 
2 Voltaire’s satire does not lapse into “old-fashioned irrationalism” or hold reason suspect. Someone might 
claim this today because in the contemporary academic climate, “postmodern” thought has been accused of such 
irresponsible behavior. Terry Eagleton, in After Theory, points out that modernity and postmodernity are known for 
holding reason suspect. The suspicion makes it difficult to distinguish between legitimate complaints and “old-
fashioned irrationalism,” he writes. Eagleton’s idea is mentioned here because we must understand contemporary 
2 
 The answer to these questions is “No.”3 Candide is not an irrational or irresponsible 
game. The eighteenth century saw serious scientists writing satires on their own lab reports.4 
Candide is no different; it is a silly-serious investigation into the relationship between abstract 
principles and the people who hold them. In the eighteenth century there was “tonal harmony” 
between satire and science. Candide’s refusal to prove anything, but instead drawing out 
testimony, is characteristically eighteenth century. I claim that the text teaches the reader to 
become aware of interpretation as the willful commitment that it is. Readers learn to see their 
interpretation as both appetitive and rational. For example, the answer to the question “Are 
metaphysical connections broken?” reveals our own appetites, our own willful commitments to 
use our judgment in a certain way. In the world of Candide, no argument can be conducted 
without considering the testimony—and the body—of the remonstrator.  
 To support this overarching claim, in Chapter One, I claim that the eighteenth century 
used the human body to explore “the void.” “The void” could have been a transatlantic voyage, a 
cave, language, the cosmos or jokes. In each “void,” the human body entered the spaces—or 
horizon—and began a documentation process that inevitably stopped where the body grew tired 
(i.e., failed). As chaos theory helps us understand, failure of the body serves science in increasing 
knowledge. The decay of desire teaches lessons. This is no less the case for Candide’s desire for 
                                                                                                                                                             
readings of Candide to better understand the eighteenth-century. Terry Eagleton, After Theory (New York: Basic 
Books, 2003), 70. 
3
 I. O. Wade, “Voltaire and Candide,” Candide: The Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton and 
Company Press), 1966, 142. In his own day, Voltaire’s tale caused a dilemma. In 1759 the Journal encyclopedique 
wrote an article summarizing the story that reveals “that Candide can neither be taken seriously nor dismissed 
lightly.”  
J. G. Weightman, “The Quality of Candide,” Candide: The Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton and 
Company Press, 1966), 151. This is perhaps why the tale “started triumphantly by being banned in Paris and 
Geneva, and has gone on selling ever since.”  
4
 Kevin L. Cope, “Elastic Empiricism, Interplanetary Excursions, and the Description of the Unseen: Henry 
More’s Cosmos, John Hutton’s Caves, and Georg Friedrich Meier’s Quips.” Imagining the Sciences: expressions of 
new knowledge in the “long” eighteenth century (New York: AMS Press, 2004), 139. Additionally, he argues that 
satire and science has a “tonal harmony” in the eighteenth-century. Humor fit into scientific analysis both as an 
object of research and as a tool of that same research (145). 
3 
Cunegonde, which motivates the tale, as it is for an explorer’s desire to climb a mountain range. 
As supplies run out, blisters form or skin wrinkles and sags, we document “the void” in which 
humans exist. Unfortunately, many Candide scholars do not take this principle into account 
while reading Candide. Rather than see the failure of Candide’s desire as instructive, Candide 
scholars, more often than not, reveal the influence Rousseau has had on modern and postmodern 
thought: Failure of desire coincides with a loss of being. Such a conclusion is a mistake when 
approaching Candide. In Candide, Voltaire affirms Locke’s epistemology. 
 In Chapter Two, by building off this eighteenth-century emphasis on the human body, we 
can see that John Locke, specifically, used the human body and a “reverse-mode” of explanation 
to explore testimony and consent. Testimony, not rigorous data, began the rationalization 
process. This is to say, Locke was more interested in integrity than “proof.” The integrity of a 
testimony that recounts the explorer’s adventure is more important than the quantity or rigor of 
data compiled. The human body, not the laboratory, is the first step in the eighteenth-century 
criteria of certainty.  
 In Chapter Three, we will see that Locke’s concept of uneasiness reveals how, in the 
“reverse-mode,” volition and judgment interconnect. More to the point: A novelist who aligns 
himself with Locke’s epistemology, instead of Rousseau’s, will create a novel distinctly different 
than those novels that seek to capture the three-dimensional, emotional vitality of the main 
character. A ‘Lockean novel’ will teach “hesitation” as the reader learns to study the relationship 
between judgment and volition. In a Lockean novel, the reader is encourages to “step-back” or 
“hesitate” with respect to immediate impulses. The attainment of happiness is a technical 
problem rather than an emotional or “desire” problem. In a Lockean novel, failure of desire does 
not coincide with a loss of being but is the condition for becoming fully human (i.e., thriving). 
4 
 In Chapter Four, a close reading of Candide reveals that meals are a tool used to practice 
“hesitation” and investigate integrity.  
 In Chapter Five, the presence of Candide’s meals argues against the claim that Candide’s 
hesitation proves his “dehumanization,” “desexualization,” or “absurdity.” The presence of 
meals also challenges the claim that money and a free market become the new principles of 
community life. Meals are tools that balance various aspects of one’s life and so cultivate a 
mutually fulfilling community. Habits, not a free-market, bring health to the community. 
 In Chapter Six, we will discuss the fact that for the eighteenth century, with its focus on 
limitation and the human body, the study of limitation lead to the proper study of humanity: 
Humanity itself. This is to say, the focus on the limitation of human knowledge and the human 
body leads Candide to ask the only truly existential question: “Why does anything exist?” The 
obsession with “the void” and how the human body explored this void led quite easily to a 
question the answer to which must necessarily lie outside the limit of human existence—an 
answer that must come from “the void” itself. 
Finally, at the end of Chapter Six, I will conclude by summarize my findings. These 
findings are basically that Candide confesses its readers by revealing each reader’s testimony. 
This eisegesis is scientifically helpful when one’s goal is integrity rather than proof. The 
eighteenth century used the body and its testimony to explore “the void.” The body became the 
measure for this exploration and, as a result, the questions that rise out of bodily experience 
(example: “Why does anything exist?”) were the proper study of humanity. Our response to this 
question—whether we answer it or deny it—reveals our own willful commitments to perceived 
good. Candide teaches us that our appetites determine how we use our judgment. Likewise, our 
judgments can determine how we use our desire. By exploring the relationship between abstract 
5 
principles and the human body, eighteenth-century satire served science responsibly by revealing 
the integrity of the scientist’s position in relation to her object of analysis. 
 
6 
CHAPTER ONE 
I beg of you, gentlemen, explain for me this phrase,  
all is well, I don’t understand it.5  
-Voltaire 
 
The Void and the Body 
Introduction 
I claim that Candide teaches the reader to become aware of interpretation as an act of 
will. Readers learn to see their interpretation as both appetitive and rational. For example, the 
answer to the question “Are metaphysical connections broken?” reveals our own appetites, our 
own willful commitments to use our judgment in a certain way. In the world of Candide, no 
argument can be conducted without considering the testimony—and the body—of the 
remonstrator.  
 To support this overarching claim, here in Chapter One, I claim that because the 
eighteenth century was obsessed with “limits,” thinkers used the human body to explore “the 
void.” In each “void,” the human body entered the spaces—or horizon—and began a 
documentation process that inevitably stopped where the body grew tired (i.e. failed). As chaos 
theory helps us understand, failure of the body serves science in increasing knowledge. The 
decay of desire teaches lessons. This is no less the case for Candide’s desire for Cunegonde, 
which motivates the tale, as it is for an explorer’s desire to climb a mountain range. As supplies 
run out, blisters form or skin wrinkles and sags, we document “the void” in which humans exist. 
Unfortunately, many Candide scholars do not take this principle into account while reading 
Candide. Rather than see the failure of Candide’s desire as instructive, Candide scholars, more 
than not, reveal the influence Rousseau has had on Modern and Postmodern thought: Failure of 
                                                 
5
 Voltaire, “Well, Everything is Well,” Candide: The Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton and 
Company Press, 1966), 86. 
7 
desire coincides with a loss of being.6 Such a conclusion is a mistake when approaching 
Candide. In Candide, Voltaire affirms Locke’s epistemology. 
 
Eighteenth Century Limitation 
 The eighteenth-century mind was obsessed with “limits” and “expansion.”7 H. N. 
Brailsford writes in his biography Voltaire that for Voltaire, “philosophy” meant learning where 
                                                 
6
 Robert Wokler, “Ancient Postmodernism in the Philosophy of Rousseau,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Wokler writes that, after their deaths, Voltaire and 
Rousseau are lumped together “as if these two fiercest ideological enemies of the whole eighteenth century were 
some homogeneous Gilbertonsullivan compound” (421).  Wokler’s analysis is to show that modern thought and 
society is much indebted to Rousseau.  For example, Wokler writes, “Across what would now be termed different 
disciplines, Rousseau managed to probe and uncover some of modernity’s deepest faults, and to my mind, the 
flawed world that he portrayed throughout his writings was not only his but also ours” (438).  He writes: “Although 
they are unfortunately seldom noticed, there are many features of Rousseau’s philosophy that address the empty 
formalism and abstract foundationalism of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century metaphysics in terms later to be 
embraced by Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and their followers” (419).  And, “The 
connection between savoir and pouvoir is not just a Marxist or Nietzschean or postmodernist and Foucauldian 
theme.  It forms the kernel of the critique of what may be termed the Enlightenment Project itself by one of its main 
protagonists who, to use Hegelian language, was the an sich aber nicht fur sich, that is, who was part of it but in 
large measure did not subscribe to it” (420).  Also, concerning language, Wokler writes, “[Rousseau’s] 
understanding of the trappings of civilization is, to my mind, even richer than Foucault’s, not least because in 
Heideggaerian fashion, he understood the force of language and metaphor and the ways in which, through language, 
individuals became the victims not just of one another’s abuse of power but also of their own ideals, subjugated by 
their own conjugations, as it were, running headlong into their chains, thinking themselves free” (421).   Concerning 
government: “Rousseau set out to explain that our political institutions were themselves responsible for the crimes 
they were purported to solve, providing solutions to problems of which those solutions were in fact the cause” (423).  
Maybe most importantly for this paper is Rousseau’s concept of la liberte morale which had as its most distinctive 
feature a “peculiarly reflexive element of self-prescription.  Every morally free agent, Rousseau insisted, was 
required to follow rules established only within the depths of his own conscience in a self-reliant manner, free from 
the influences of all other persons” (425).  “Because of ideals like those listed above,” Wokler writes, “I should like, 
however, to conclude these reflections on Rousseau’s ancient postmodernism by addressing not his role in the 
French Revolution that failed to occur but rather the significance of his classical republican ideals with respect to the 
Revolution that did take place, whose greatest success and failures alike were to earn from his the status of chief 
poet and acknowledged legislator of the age of modernity we still inhabit” (430). 
Another, more specific example of how scholarship absorbs Rousseau can be seen in the article written by 
Karlis Racevski entitled “Candide’s garden re-visited, again: the post-modern view of the enlightenment.” Racevski 
writes that as we study Candide we rediscover something: “The modest recommendation offered at the conclusion 
of Voltaire’s philosophical tale seems to fit quite nicely the mood of our own [postmodern] age. Which means that 
we are rediscovering something Voltaire believed in profoundly—namely, that the recourse to abstract systems and 
metaphysical explanations is the way to delusion and catastrophe; and that constant vigilance, critical attention, and 
skepticism are still the best weapons for confronting the reality of the human condition” (310). Karlis Racevskis, 
“Candide’s garden re-visited, again: the post-modern view of the enlightenment,” Studies on Voltaire and the 
eighteenth century 303 (1992): 310. 
7
 In a paper discussing the interest in “eruptive” and “expansive” knowledge, Dr. Kevin Cope rhetorically 
asks, “Whence this persisting taste for the eruptive? Scholars of eighteenth-century literature usually ascribe the 
popular taste for scientific drama to the nascent interest in the sublime, per the writings of Edmund Burke, 
8 
to stop asking questions.8 The same is true of Voltaire’s teacher, Locke. Locke was the first 
modern philosopher to investigate the limit and scope of human knowledge and the prominent 
place knowledge has in modern philosophy is due to his work.9 Locke wanted to know what 
objects were appropriate for reason to investigate. He wanted to identify what it was appropriate 
for humans to discuss with certainty.10  
 This emphasis on limitation brings up an interesting question: Copleston coolly asks 
Locke, “How can we know the mind’s scope if we do not let the mind go as far as it can?” Or, 
said another way, “If we mention an object that we cannot deal with, have we not already begun 
dealing with it?”11 Philosophy can reach too far; philosophy might not reach far enough. And so 
we must ask, “How do we know when we are finished philosophizing?” 
 Oddly enough, the notion of progress allowed eighteenth-century thinkers to escape the 
seriousness of the problem: They began investigations and allowed posterity to complete the 
project.12 For example, we see eighteenth-century scientists “entering the void” and applying 
                                                                                                                                                             
Immanuel Kant, and a bevy of ardent poets. Even in the eighteenth century, however, that taste depended on several 
supplemental factors: on a knowledge of far-away places; on the means to travel to those places so as to pain, reflect 
upon, or verify them; and on a general enlargement of the idea of what cultured persons should be discussing—on a 
new commitment to “immensity,” whether in the range of useful information or in the sheer magnitude of objects 
that interested cultivated people.” Kevin L. Cope, “Age of Reason, An Age of Eruptions, Some Ages of Immensity: 
The Future of Eighteenth-Century Values,” Lecture (The 2008 East Lecture at Lynchburg College, Lynchburg 
Virginia), 4. 
8
 H. N. Brailsford, Voltaire (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 122. 
9
 Frederick Copleston, “John Locke (1),” A History of Philosophy, Volume V: Modern Philosophy, the 
British Philosophers from Hobbes to Hume (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 71.  
Also, G. A. J. Rogers, “The Intellectual Settings of Locke’s Essay,” The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s 
Essay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9. “Locke actually, in many respects, created what we know 
as philosophy.” 
10
 Copleston, “John Locke (1),” 72.  
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Cope, “Elastic Empiricism,” 138. Cope writes, “The phrase used on every grant application [today], 
‘more research is needed,’ loaded as it is with suggestions of incompleteness and incompetence, may have its origins 
in the relentless quest for multiplicity that spans early modern science.” 
John A. McCarthy, “Beyond a Philosophy of Alternatives: Chaos, Cosmology and the Eighteenth Century,” 
Disrupted Patterns: on chaos and order in the Enlightenment (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 26. McCarthy points out 
that this emphasis on “beginning” research drove Kant crazy: “Surveying the intellectual landscape,” McCarthy 
writes, “[Kant] remarked that the genesis of intellectual inquiry from dogmatism to skepticims to the physiological 
foundations of thought (Locke) had led to a pervasive ‘indifferentism,’ a kind of laissez-faire attitude in intellectual 
9 
rationality to it.13 Whether the void was the cosmos, language, the sea or jokes, in each space 
rationality begins with the scientist’s presence. The eighteenth-century thinker used the human 
body to measure the void. That is, the body exhausts itself for science’s sake; the body is 
science’s chief tool in the rationalization of uncharted horizons. For the eighteenth-century mind, 
the joy of a vigorous hike in the mountains—camera and journal is tow—was not very different 
from snuggling up with Tristram Shandy for the afternoon. The human brought rationality along 
with her and her presence alone, as a body, began the exploration (and therefore rationalization) 
of the space.14  
 Copleston, in summarizing aspects of the French Enlightenment, touches upon a 
fundamental commitment of the Enlightenment mind: The movement was not a cool, scientific 
one. For eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire, the passions rule reason. 
“Without the passions,” Copleston explains, “there would be no human progress.”15 Human 
passions and reason complement one another in the search for scientific truth. The human body 
with its pleasure, excitement and pain begins the philosophizing and rationalizing process.  
                                                                                                                                                             
pursuits. A ‘chaos’ of approaches had resulted, he claimed, which obfuscates any attempt in the sciences to establish 
standarts of rational analysis and logical rigor. […] He saw the lack of order an opportunity for new beginnings. The 
potential—indeed, the need—for a new beginning is what fascinated him.”   
13
 Cope, “Elastic Empiricism.” Such exploration can be seen in the life’s work of eighteenth century 
researchers like Henry More, John Hutton, and Georg Meier.  Dr. Kevin Cope, in his essay “Elastic Empiricism,” 
analyzes these researchers’ works and shows how each scholar analyzed and imposed rationality onto a different 
void (109). Such thinkers reveal eighteenth-century impulses to explore the “unseen.” Cope explains that the 
eighteenth-century scientist had “invisibilitarian inclinations” (113). He writes that human society rationalizes the 
void; the eighteenth-century scientist would “play up” the mysteriousness of a void just as often as she would 
“explain away” mysterious expanses. That is, science ‘opened up’ a discussion instead of controlling, defining and 
ending exploration. This can be seen in research on laughter which explains jokes but also makes jokes and adds to 
their mystery (142).  
14
 Clearly this is much different than the contemporary relationship between desire and science. Rather than 
prove science’s downfall via the body (and with its violent sexuality), the eighteenth century body served science. 
For example, Rene Pomeau writes that, in Candide, “Optimism and pessimism are experienced, not so much as 
ideas, but as contrasted modes of existence.” Rene Pomeau, “Providence, Pessimism, and Absurdity,” The Norton 
Critical Edition (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 137. 
15
 Frederick Copleston, “The French Enlightenment (I),” A History of Philosophy, Volume VI: Modern 
Philosophy, From the French Enlightenment to Kant (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 24. 
10 
But, for the eighteenth century, “to begin” was the point. The emphasis of eighteenth-
century thinker on “beginning” a process that would later conclude helps us understand 
Candide’s “hesitation.” Also, eighteenth-century, forward-thinking, void-entering excitement is 
why “hesitation” is so important to understand: As we will see, Modern scholars read Candide’s 
ending as representing a “dehumanization,” a “desexualization” and an portrayal of the “tragic 
sense of life.”16 Modern scholarship reads Candide’s hesitation as eloquently expressing his 
humiliation. For people who believe, just as modern philosophy emphasizes, that we must “know 
with certainty” to begin working productively, Candide is indeed humiliated.  
 But Candide’s physical presence, his body-as-body in the world has already begun 
speaking despite his verbal silence.17 He hesitates to speak, but his body has a language of its 
own. His body has already begun to rationalize and order his world. Although he hesitates to 
conclude in an eloquent deluge of words like Pangloss and refuses to slouch pathetically into 
despair with Martin, he does not hesitate to have a body. It is this body that begins the 
rationalization process for the eighteenth-century thinker. His intellectual commitment to 
                                                 
16
 Theodore E. D. Braun, “Chas, Contingency, and Candide,” 1650-1850; ideas, aesthetics and inquiries in 
the early modern era 6 (2001): 202. 
17
 Kevin L. Cope, “Introduction,” Talking Forward, Talking Back (New York: AMS Press, 2002), vii. The 
importance of the body to come into contact with the object of analysis strikes a sharp contrast to academic research 
that has been conducted in the 1980s and 1990s: “No verb was more common than ‘apply,’ no noun more common 
than ‘method’—as if the interpretation of John Dryden’s verse or Aphra Behn’s prose analogized the application of 
routine mechanical techniques to predictable tasks.” “It is no wonder,” Cope continues, “that literary criticism now 
labors under the sense of never having made contact with the works that were approached” (vii). Cope points out 
that texts remain passive and mute while critics dissect them; contemporary criticism does not cultivate dialogue 
between humans. Each new approach to the text does not admit its own historical moment but pretends to approach 
literature from outside of time […] and literary tradition” (viii). The human body, with its perspective attached, is no 
longer appropriate for research. But this is a problem because “Restoration and eighteenth century authors often 
entered into self-conscious conversations with futurity” (ix).  Eighteenth-century texts call for human readers, not 
for laboratory tools.  
Rudiger Ahrens, “Epilogue,” Talking Forward, Talking Back (New York: AMS Press, 2002), 382. The 
book Talking Forward, Talking Back seeks to participate as a compilation of essays designed, not to prove positions, 
but to begin new dialogues. This is an important development because it affirms “the revelation of truth as a 
metaphysical telos” instead of merely “different kinds of practice.”  Dialogue encourages different perspectives of 
objectivity whereas “proving someone else wrong” implies that the wrong-doer should stop being herself and do as 
you do.  
11 
“hesitate” is a decided attempt to balance his body with his mind, to cultivate the conditions for 
hope. And hope is evidence for things unseen. 
  
The Eighteenth-Century Chaotic Void 
The discussion of “the void” and the particular human body that explores it brings up 
“chaos theory.” Chaos theory helps us understand how radical attention to particularity translates 
to abstraction. When a particular human body enters a space, we inevitably start discussing 
abstractions like morality. Chaos theory helps us understand why this is the case. Terry Eagleton 
explains, “The eighteenth century developed aesthetics not as the language about art—but as a 
way of investigating bodily experience.  Moral talk was talk about the body.  Their talk hovered 
ambiguously between the physical and spiritual.”18 The body and its particularity (something 
Eagleton observes postmoderns use to claim the downfall of “Objectivity”19) is the very medium 
that secures Objectivity. 
This emphasis on morality is an important aspect of eighteenth century exploration of 
“limitations.” Aaron Santesso writes: “Two hundred years before chaos theory, Burke was 
anticipating the interest in the liberating “uncertainty” inherent in encountering works of 
seemingly disordered complexity.  This interest would set the stage for a number of literary uses 
of chaos during the Romantic period.”20  This pleasure of disorder and relativism has since been 
                                                 
18
 Eagleton, After Theory, 155. 
19
 Ibid., 103-5.  Commitments place a person ‘here’ or ‘there.’  Our bodies give us perspectives of the truth 
just like our minds give us perspective of the truth.  As a result, to be a relativist is to be a racist. 
20
 Aaron Santesso, “Aesthetic Chaos in the Age of Reason,” Disrupted Patterns: on chaos and order in the 
Enlightenment (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 46. “Radical shifts in the estimation of chaos began to take place long 
before the advent of modern chaos theory.  One of the most significant of these shifts occurred during the supposed 
‘Age of Reason,’ when artists and critics began to forge a new understanding of chaos as an aesthetic rather than 
theological concept.” 
12 
inherited by postmodernity.21  But this inherited interest in disorder is a lot different than the 
interest of eighteenth-century writers who used the language of the body to “touch new vistas of 
knowledge”: Eighteenth-century interest in disorder applied insofar as a disorder seemed to be a 
vast uncharted territory awaiting documentation and analysis; they did not interest themselves for 
disorder-for-disorder’s sake.22   
That Candide would interrupt Pangloss’ explanation and focus attention on the body was 
by no means an isolated event. Writers of the eighteenth century were increasingly interested in 
morality, in how the body relates to the general universal principles that govern human society 
(for example, in how syphilis might affect a belief in Optimism).23 Satire was the perfect space to 
explore this relationship. But, the eighteenth century did not share contemporary scholars’ 
rejection of metaphysics. The body began metaphysical investigation. Cope outlines how an 
approach that analyzed what was “behind” what was known led to knowledge that focused on 
limits but always attempted to move beyond these limits.24 Voltaire refocused attention on the 
body, but this re-attention was not meant as a rejection of “the spiritual.” Of course, the recurring 
acts of violence that scar the bodies of the tale must be understood, but just as violence argues 
for “meaninglessness” for a modern scholar, so too the body, although scarred, begins a 
rationalization of the void for the eighteenth-century thinker. 
                                                 
21
 Terry Eagleton, After Theory, 67-68; 70-71. Eagleton writes: “Postmodernity gets off the ground when it 
is no longer a matter of nagging information about the world, but a matter of the world as information. [….  This] 
radical assault on fixed hierarchies of value merged effortlessly with that revolutionary leveling of all values known 
as the marketplace” (67-68).  Eagleton goes on to say that the 1960s and 70s saw an attempt made by theory to get 
beyond itself.  Theory began to study “impossible desires” and hoped these would be an exorbitant move (70).  
Postmodern thought saw reflection as being part of the problem and so it turned to “those things that baffle it: desire, 
the body, pleasure, etc.” (71). 
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What is more, not only does the presence of a human body begin a moral discussion, but 
satire itself, as a “chaotic medium,” resists moral annihilation. Cope writes, “True chaos, total 
disorder, is too categorical for cynical satire.  Whenever a satirist appears on the scene, 
thoroughgoing anarchy disappears.  A satiric universe that generates a moralist is a universe that 
resists moral annihilation.”25 Annihilation is not possible because satirists need a physical 
position in order to enact satire: “Satirists’ hopes for social stability are perplexed by the fact that 
they must start their works somewhere.  They may pretend to omniscience, but they almost 
always identify their physical position”—like a theatrical “Demonstrator”26 in a French drawing 
room, for example. Cope does on to explain that,  
The fact that satirists reside in this world, that they are somewhere, opens them to abuse.  
Tragedians can execute their characters knowing that they will be backed up by a 
transcendental Nemisis.  Satirists, alas, are ordinary lunch-pail packers working on the 
corner.  [Satire] is always self-satiric, for its spatio-temporal positioning is incongruous 
with its categorical judgments.27   
Intentional chaos, disorder and confusion were not damaging or “irresponsible” behaviors in the 
eighteenth-century author’s mind. Simply by being a writer who wrote a satire, the author 
affirms an order even if this order is not present in the text. Although a satire does not overtly 
“prove” any position, the satiric text does challenge the integrity of the satirized object and the 
author. It is the human body—with its physical presence and its testimony—that saves the satirist 
from annihilation. To satirize one’s self and one’s culture is a lot different than committing 
suicide. 
The body grounded the caustic, satiric impulse making it responsible. But the body also 
helps the scientist move “beyond” the body. Like the satirist who includes her own body in the 
                                                 
25
 Kevin L. Cope, “Algorithmic Apocalypse: Chaos, Cognitive Science, and the Conditions of Satire,” 
Talking Forward, Talking Back: Critical Dialogues With the Enlightenment (New York: AMS Press, 2002), 366. 
26
 William F. Bottiglia, Voltaire’s Candide: Analysis of a Classic (Geneva: Institut et Musee Voltaire, 
1964), 77.  Candide implies a concrete audience as it is performed.  In this it is like a play. 
27
 Cope, “Algorithmic,” 364. 
14 
objects mocked, a scientist used the body as a tool to get “beyond” the body itself. For the 
empiricist of the time, the body, like any other scientific tool, was not the point at all: 
Researchers of the eighteenth century show “a surprising lack of enthusiasm for the ‘experience’ 
that was allegedly the focus of its attention.”28  While we do find “imaginary literary discourses 
in Berkeley, Hume, Descartes, and Kant, we do not find a deluge of the serious ‘technical 
reports’” that we would assume are there.29  Looking to study empirical writing of the eighteenth 
century will reveal more “talk than data, more art than experience.”30  Cope notes that “By 
developing theories and definitions as to what was tangible and what was mere chimera, those in 
the empiricist school inadvertently drew attention to what was not part of the sensory field.” For 
John Locke and Immanuel Kant, for example, short paragraphs defining and explaining sensually 
intuited ideas are dwarfed by extended passages on intellection, reflection, language, 
communication, and a host of other semi- and non-empirical matters.”31 And, “Procedurally if 
not methodically, early empiricism was split between the refocusing of attention on day-to-day, 
easily accessible experiences and probing into unknown, presently unseen places and spaces.”32 
The body was the tool that began the scientist’s work, but it was not ultimately the object of 
analysis. The hope in progress pushed researchers toward the “presently” unseen.  They sought 
expansion and development of discoveries. The eighteenth century thinker was interested in what 
was not visible, but it was “heroic scientific efforts”—and heroically satiric literature—that 
revealed these invisibilities and showed them for what they were.33  Any place of conflict, 
confusion, and irrationality—“void”—was of greatest interest to the eighteenth century.  
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Scientists did not do science only in a lab with precise, controlled experiments.  They brought 
rationality into caves, into jokes, and into the cosmos.34 
 
The Modern Response to Hesitation 
A general understanding of how “the body” served science helps us challenge some 
interpretations of Candide’s “hesitation” at the end of the story. Candide’s hesitation leads many 
scholars to conclude that metaphysical connections are broken once and for all. That is to say, 
Candide’s hesitation is synonymous with the failure of metaphysics; if we cannot know for 
certain, then we cannot believe. Hesitation coincides with the loss of the light of God and 
modern thought casts its tragically dark shadow across the earth. For these scholars, Candide 
portrays the tragedy of human life, its absurdity and ridiculousness. The hesitation at the end of 
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the story affirms this dark portrayal and reveals Candide’s denial of ultimate meaning. To 
encourage this denial of meaning, it is argued, Candide resists theoretical interpretation just as 
any survey of Candide scholarship reveals. 
For example, Candide’s moral “darkness” and the overall loss of meaning led one 
scholar, Theodore E. D. Braun, to focus attention on an analysis of recurring elements of the 
story.35  Braun observes that the story “argues consistently against teleological interpretations of 
human life and advances a sense of the contingent, unpredictable nature of Nature.”36  Braun 
shows that recurring elements of the story allow for a continued and gradual “darkening” of the 
story and an ultimately “tragic sense of life.”37  Braun points out that the end of the tale is really 
only the “opening of a new tragedy”—the pattern of order/disorder will continue even though the 
tale is over.38 
This “darkening”39 helps communicate the “implicit moral lesson” of the tale.40 In 
Candide, Voltaire is communicating something about how ignorance and evil are closely tied.  In 
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the tale, stupidity and violence often follow upon one another’s heels.41 The safety of the final 
garden is really only ignorance; the characters will soon encounter another, more tragically 
violent force. 
Of course, the interplay of peace and violence relates back to the problem of Optimism: 
How can humanity exist in an evil, yet God-centered, universe? Braun writes: “Candide might 
not yet be able to accept a chaotic world view, but he can reject a Providential one that seems to 
leave little room for free will.”42 Braun completes his analysis of Candide with the statement: 
“We are back, so to speak, at the beginning, the pattern is about to recur.  Chaos will reign.”43 
Braun sums up the story like a pessimistic modern scholar.  The moral lesson relates to the 
garden where we see a brief happiness but anticipate that a new violent event overshadows this 
peace. Candide’s hesitation—his failure to explain his life—cries out that God and evil cannot 
exist together. Because evil remains with us, we must jettison God and accept chaos.  
But as an overview of eighteenth-century use of the body reveals, physical violence can 
have an opposite meaning. No, Candide does not have an “answer,” but he does have a new 
habit: Cultivation. Braun does not consider that it is this new habit which makes the garden 
possible. Whether another violent act sweeps over them or not will not stop them from enacting 
this new habit. “To cultivate” does not require a garden beforehand. Cultivation creates a garden. 
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The body helps create meaning. For the eighteenth century, the body serves science. A habit of 
the body works against the “darkening” that violence might bring about. 
 
Hesitation as “Chaotic Decay” 
Braun’s thoughts about Candide’s “darkness” occur within a thread of dialogue 
concerning chaos theory. Chaos theory helps to explain how satire challenges meaning-creating 
systems without bringing these systems to ultimate destruction. The concept of “branch points” 
is helpful. A branch point is that moment just before “closure” or the breakdown of a system 
where a system “leaps” and reaffirm a new, “higher” order—an order that includes the decay of 
the first system as part of the new order. A branch point is where the system reaches its limit and 
branches into an order that was previously invisible.  
At the moments when a system is going to become tragically “disordered” again, it 
branches into a new order; it does not “close” into disorder but affirms a new kind of order.44  
Chaos theory does not explain a closed, tragic circle of one kind of order crashing into disorder.  
Chaos theory explains decay and how this decay destroys one kind of order only to affirm 
another, higher order. This second order includes the decay and failure of the first order.  
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Chaos theory shows how a system’s decay produces new, different meaning. Cope 
observes that chaos theory shows that “degeneration produces information” and that, 
“information and satire have a common, if slippery, foundation: decay.”45 Chaos theory shows 
that “decay” does not necessarily result in loss of meaning; rather, it results in different meaning.  
Although different, this new meaning is no less meaningful. Such is the case with Candide. Each 
scholar must put forward an interpretation of the central metaphor because Voltaire does not 
explain his hesitation over Optimism. The decay of the text forces us to supply order; how we 
incorporate “decay” into a meaningful statement reveals the tale’s lesson: We reveal the integrity 
of our own beliefs as we try to fit decay into an interpretation. 
Braum rejects Providence while affirming “darkness” and all its relativism. But, “never 
relativistic, chaos theory focuses on particulars while it affirms a teleology of form […] it deals 
with particular phenomena […] yet it suggests a more general, enticingly flexible understanding 
of “nature.”46 Cope argues that satires are neither completely relativistic nor do they really 
conclude. Cope points out that an iterative system moves freely between particularity and 
abstraction.47 Chaos theory helps us conceptualize how the eighteenth century’s radical focus on 
particularity (i.e., the body) helps document and explore the radically abstract (i.e. metaphysics). 
Chaos theory also helps us see that the body argues against modern pessimism: Just by 
exploring, the body starts a rationalization process and although no overt conclusion has been 
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offered in Candide, the physical commitment to cultivate begins a meaning-creating system. 
Cultivation attempts to fit failure into a higher order. Cultivation hopes all things.  
The eighteenth-century void and the modern void greatly differ from one another. 
Whereas today the body (and its desire) “proves” the failure of science’s dominion, the 
eighteenth century used the body to explore the void until the body itself became exhausted. 
Failure of the body, not science, was the important event because at the point of failure, 
knowledge increases. The “decay” of desire produces knowledge, and knowledge overcomes 
evil. Failure has a lesson for anyone who wants to learn about integrity. 
 
Candide’s Failure 
A cynical man will point out that Candide foolishly falls in love with Cunegonde without 
realizing that half the world’s population will sufficiently do the job. But this is not how desire 
works. At least, this is not how Voltaire understood human desire. As we shall see in Candide, 
for Voltaire—as for Locke, Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle—what determines the will serves 
both as its efficient and formal cause.48 This means that Ms. Cunegonde is not just one fish 
among many; she stimulates Candide to act, and it is she herself who tantalizingly offers Candide 
happiness. Her body is his formal cause. Through her body, he thinks he will reach his 
happiness. 
For Candide, a belief in Optimism, and “happiness” in general, coincided with his 
attainment of Cunegonde’s body.  This connection between thought and material is not 
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coincidental. In Candide, concepts are knit into the sinew of the human body; human bodies 
affect concepts and are affected by them. Because judgment connects to the appetites, Candide’s 
belief in the goodness of the world coincides with his ability to attain a specific woman.  
The connection between body and mind creates a violent world: sexual beauty in 
particular is consumed, traded and mutilated to help facilitate self-fulfillment. For example, 
Candide sees Cunegonde with “hungry eyes”49 and Cunegonde herself, after a separation from 
Candide, sees his naked body and is filled with desire for him; she tells him that her mind was 
full of the “touch” of their first sexual encounter. Her attraction is not a noble one; she, like 
Candide, values the stimulation of her own senses over the companionship he offers her.50 And 
here we engage a central problem for Candide. 
Candide’s happiness has a formal cause: Cunegonde. But Cunegonde, too, seeks 
happiness through formal causes. She seeks happiness through means that complicate Candide’s 
pursuit of happiness—for she herself is his formal cause. This conflict is not isolated. All the 
characters seek happiness through some formal cause, often embodied in another character. The 
characters jerk one another about violently; each tries to attain their own perceived good by 
using whatever formal cause might be available. As a result, we see a world of manipulation, 
robbery, torture, rape, murder, and cannibalism. The characters use one another to try to reach 
the goodness they perceive. Inevitably their desires conflict with one another. 
Developing this theme of manipulation, Moishe Black, in “The Human Body in 
Candide,” analyzes the representation of the human body in Candide.  An overwhelming number 
                                                 
49
 Voltaire, Candide: The Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 14. 
50
 Moishe Black, “The Place of the Human Body in Candide,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth 
Century 278 (1990): 184. 
22 
of “body” nouns fill the tale.51  While looking at various kinds of physical violence, Black argues 
that the human body is continually present and always closely tied to violence.  Black jokingly 
points out that the tale is so violent that characters die more than once. Black argues that 
characters harm even without intention (for example, through transmitting syphilis).52  The tale 
reveals a world of anti-agency, a world where strong hungers go unsatisfied in a cold, violent 
world. Each act results in unforeseen consequences and the goodness a character reaches for 
through a formal cause does not necessarily materialize. The tale shows a world of complicated 
and unpredictable effects to any desire. No matter how sincere or forceful, desires remain anti-
agents in the character’s lives.53 In a word, desire fails. 
 
Modern Response to Failure 
Failed desire leads most Candide scholars to argue that the story proves that metaphysical 
connections are illusory. Modern Candide critics, who think in this way, summarize Candide as 
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revealing a denial of purpose, pleasure and meaning.54  As a result, at the end of the story, the 
only “hope” Candide might have is a “grim determinism” to cultivate.55 Bonneville, in Candide 
and the Form of the Novel, asserts that, at the end of Candide, all metaphysical connections, 
including love,56 are broken.57 Bonneville writes, Voltaire realizes that “love is the only physical 
drive susceptible of abstraction.”58 And so, Bonneville interprets, “Candide […] is filled with 
events which are calculated to be destructive of love as an intellectualized concept.” What is 
more, “in Candide the destruction of the ideal is systematic and complete.”59 
Bonneville argues that with the destruction of metaphysical connections, Candide is “a 
man dehumanized” when “after literally a lifetime of body- and soul-rending experience he is 
repulsed by the very object of his quest.60 Bonneville continues his claims by stating that 
“Candide transcends the rest of Voltaire’s productions and perhaps the rest of Enlightenment 
literature” because, “[h]aving brought his hero to this pass,” Voltaire “is faced with either a 
nihilistic conclusion of the necessity of constructing an ethic without violating the esthetic 
principles to which he has committed himself.”61 In this plight, writes Bonneville, “No 
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abstraction, says [Candide], endows life with meaning, not even when the abstraction is based on 
such a primary vital force as love. Meaning is derived from the productive fulfillment of the 
individual’s potential. In the miniature society of Candide’s garden, each character is doing what 
he does best.”62 And so Bonneville summarizes Candide. 
But, while Candide portrays a violent world where desire fails, this world does not 
necessarily result in dehumanization. Failure teaches. If the eighteenth-century emphasis on the 
body is understood, we can see that the failure of the body instructs a human and new habits will 
lead to greater pleasure. The body, not abstraction, endows life with meaning. That is, the body 
builds meaning into abstractions; the body serves scientific exploration of “the void.” 
This constructive use of failure can be supported in Candide: Candide’s faithful servant 
Cacambo informs Candide of Cunegonde’s tragic ugliness. Candide grimly responds, “Ah, 
beautiful or ugly [. . .] I am an honest man, and my duty is to love her forever.”63  While this 
sounds delightfully stoic, Candide begins to stew in self-pity.  Unfulfilled desire is depressing. 
Modern scholars are quick to emphasize this. 
But Candide does not remain depressed. A few lines later Candide asks Martin, “Who in 
your opinion is more to be pitied, the Emperor Achmet, the Emperor Ivan, Kind Charles Edward, 
or myself?”64  Martin responds: “I have no idea [. . .]  I would have to enter your hearts in order 
to tell.”  They continue the conversation:  
Ah, said Candide, if Panlgoss were here, he would know and he would tell us.  I can’t 
imagine, said Martin, what scales your Pangloss would use to weigh out the miseries of 
men and value their griefs.  All I will venture is that the earth holds millions of men who 
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deserve our pity a hundred more times than King Charles Edward, Emperor Ivan, or 
Sultan Achmet.65 
This snippet of dialogue reveals a subtle shift in which Candide begins to anticipate the anti-
agency of his desire instead of only thinking of his goal. He begins to pay attention to the formal 
causes that influence his desire. At the end of the story, Candide begins to compare his failure to 
everyone else’s failure. He realizes that everyone fails to attain fulfillment; no one is happy. 
Candide tries to understand how fulfillment or happiness is possible for anyone, ever. He pauses 
in his quest for self-fulfillment and considers the importance of human anti-agency itself; he 
investigates the possible lesson in failure-as-failure.  
 He thinks about how an adjustment of one’s habits will result in greater fulfillment. By 
using one’s body in a new, different way (cultivation) one can use ones’s body to create order 
and ground abstractions in rationality. Habits connect bodies to abstractions. 
 
Modern Epistemology: Locke versus Rousseau 
Candide’s new found perspective at the end of Candide reveals the profound differences 
between Locke and Rousseau’s epistemology. Rousseau and Locke both focus on the senses, but 
they say radically different things about “sense data.” Rousseau has obviously influenced 
modern and postmodern thought, which in turn has influenced contemporary Voltaire critics. We 
can see this influence in particular when contemporary scholars argue that Candide is 
dehumanized and desexualized and works without meaning or purpose. 
 In Rousseau, morality is the “unthwarted and unperverted development of man’s natural 
passions and feelings.”66 This means that “to exist” is “to feel.”67 For Rousseau, “We have an 
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autonomous, rational will or practical reason whereby man in his higher nature, so to speak, 
legislates for himself and pronounces a moral law to which he, in his lower nature, is subject. 
And this law is universal [and also called the “general will”]. This autonomous will […] is an 
obvious anticipation of the Kantian ethic.”68 For Rousseau, desire is perfect unto itself. It is 
human society that corrupts, thwarts and perverts one’s original perfection. As a result, a loss of 
desire coincides with a loss of being.  
Rousseau emphasizes an immediacy and “sincerity” of feeling which leads modernity 
and postmodernity to associate truth with strong feelings. When such scholarship finds that 
Candide lacks strong feelings, they argue that he has experienced a loss of being. If Candide 
hesitates to come to a conclusion or experiences thwarted desire, he therefore must have 
experienced a loss of being, be dehumanized or desexualized. 
Voltaire absorbed Locke’s thought and Locke perceived human knowledge in a radically 
different way than Rousseau. For Locke, interpersonal knowledge begins with an agreement 
between ideas. That is, “knowledge” is the “perception of agreement between ideas.”69 Ideas can 
be sense data, concepts and universal ideas (Copleston points out that this careless use of the 
term “idea” scarcely serves the cause of clarity”70). We can see the radical difference between 
Locke’s and Rousseau’s epistemology. For Rousseau, the individual’s unadulterated, immediate 
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impressions of the world are the height of knowledge. Human society only serves to corrupt 
these first impressions. In contrast, Locke establishes knowledge in what Rousseau 
anathematizes: Society.  
For Locke, knowledge begins at the point we perceive an agreement between our ideas 
about the world. For Locke, immediate impressions are not knowledge; knowledge comes about 
only after first impressions are brought into agreement with the larger society. Perceiving an 
agreement between ideas is knowledge. As we will see in the next two chapters, Locke’s search 
for agreement helps us understand why Voltaire has Candide “hesitate” at the end of the tale.  
 
Conclusion 
The eighteenth-century focus on limitation is important for Candide because its subject is 
“human nature” itself. Eighteenth-century empiricist focused on the failure of the body—or on 
the “blocks” and “invisibilities” reason encounters.71 By rationally investigating “the void,” 
eighteenth-century thinkers hoped to probe beyond the blocks and invisibilities reason 
encounters. This epistemological commitment is important because, with Candide, human nature 
is the object the text analyzes and also the tool that advances our knowledge about metaphysical 
commitments. Candide does not document the slow loss of meaning, but probes into the 
mysteries surrounding human existence. The body is essential for this exploration. 
 As I develop my argument about how Candide teaches the reader to become aware of 
interpretation as the willful commitment that it is, we must first see that because the eighteenth 
century was obsessed with limits, thinkers used the human body to explore “the void.” The void 
could have been a transatlantic voyage, a cave, language, the cosmos or jokes. In each void, the 
human body entered the spaces—or horizon—and began a documentation process that inevitably 
                                                 
71
 Cope, “Elastic Empiricism,” 113. 
28 
stopped where the body grew tired (i.e., failed). As chaos theory helps us understand, failure of 
the body serves science by increasing knowledge. The decay of desire teaches lessons. This is no 
less the case for Candide’s desire for Cunegonde, which motivates the tale, as it is for an 
explorer’s desire to climb a mountain range. As supplies run out, blisters form or skin wrinkles 
and sags, we document “the void” in which humans exist. Chaos theory helps us understand why 
satire and science has a “tonal harmony” in the eighteenth-century. As this harmony between 
satire and science shows, Candide’s failure is not meant to argue against metaphysics or show his 
dehumanization. Failure did not coincide with a loss of being in Voltaire’s Lockean world. 
Candide critics reveal their commitments to Rousseau’s understanding of desire and immediate 
impressions when they advance interpretations that associate hesitation with a loss of being. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Though [Candide] talked this way,  
he did not neglect the food. 
-Voltaire 
 
The Body and Locke’s Reverse-Mode 
Introduction 
To further develop my argument that Candide teaches the relationship between judgment 
and will (and how to “hesitate”), we will look more closely at how John Locke used the body to 
ground knowledge in testimony. By building off the eighteenth-century emphasis on the human 
body, we can see that John Locke, specifically, used the human body and a “reverse-mode” of 
explanation to explore testimony and consent. Testimony, not rigorous data, began the 
rationalization process. This means that, Locke was more interested in the integrity of a position 
than “proof.” The integrity of a testimony that recounts the explorer’s adventure is more 
important than the quantity or rigor of data compiled. The human body, not the laboratory, is the 
first step in the eighteenth-century criteria of certainty.  
 
Locke’s Systematicity 
 Candide’s shift from seeking the goal of his own happiness to thinking about “failure” 
reveals the Lockean world that influenced Voltaire. The world of Candide is the world of 
Locke.72 We see the connection between Locke and Voltaire through their treatment of human 
desire and their mutual interest in testimony rather than proof. 
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 For Locke, knowledge was a “fitting” of “truth-seeking to the truth-supporting world.”73  
For example, Locke writes: 
First, Our simple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things: not that they are all of 
them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the 
primary qualities of bodies, has been already shown.  But, though whiteness and coldness 
are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c., 
being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce 
in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that 
are really in things themselves.  For, these several appearances being designed to be the 
mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas 
do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they 
be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things 
themselves: the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct 
constitution of real beings.  But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes 
or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them.  And thus 
our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of 
things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requisite to make them real, 
and not fictions at pleasure.  For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly 
confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more 
than what it has received.74 
Order was from confusion “wrung.”75 Because knowledge was a “fitting” of self to world, a 
stronger desire did not answer the problematic relationship of the two.  Fulfillment is technical, a 
matter of organization and discipline. Left to themselves, human desires act as anti-agents. They 
must be controlled and organized so they “make sense.” “Knowing” is equivalent to perceiving 
the agreement between ideas.76 
Because knowledge is perceiving an agreement—or a “fit”—between self and world, 
Locke and Voltaire emphasize the personal nature of knowledge: They focus on testimony. To 
advance this concept, both writers use a “metaphor” instead of a proposition. Locke discusses 
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“consent” which is “agreeing together”; Voltaire concludes his story with the enigmatic 
“cultivate your garden.” This behavior causes problems because with these metaphors, there is 
no “analytic sense of what a rational person ought to [consent to or cultivate].”77 Locke was not 
interested in proving something as being “right or wrong” as, for example, we can see from his 
underdeveloped proofs of God’s existence.78  Locke was interested in seeing if a body of 
knowledge—like scripture or the Christian tradition—had a congruity with reason.79  Locke was 
concerned with the effects of a belief, not the truth-value of the belief itself.80 And so we learn 
the process of fitting ourselves to the world instead of following an Objective guidebook. Locke 
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affirmed metaphors such as “consent” instead of offering his readers an analytic sense of what 
they should consent to do. Like Locke, Voltaire offered his own metaphor: “Cultivation.” 
  
The Process of Consent: “The Reverse-Mode” 
 Scholars are not sure about Candide’s central metaphor for the same reason philosophers 
reject Locke’s “consent” as being unclear. Both writers fail to explain themselves. Instead, 
readers learn a process of consent. Voltaire and Locke do not help uncover the dictates of reason 
or what can legitimately motivate “cultivation.” Locke, like the eighteenth-century thinkers who 
predated him, sought out conflicts and applied reason to them.81 Locke’s “philosophizing” is a 
system of explaining how these conflicts exist and how they can be resolved. His thoughts are 
not aimed at proof; he accounts for the process leading to resolution or consent. 
 For Locke confrontation is essential for knowledge and is the “foundation of explanation 
and the explanatory mode.”82  Locke “stabilizes but asserts the priority of a world of artifice.”83  
Artifice for Locke, Cope explains, is the “relation of evidence to explanatory discourse” which 
“ceases to be a one-way affair; his human world and its real counterparts parallel, lead to, and 
sometimes collide with one another.”84  The world of systematicity is an artificial one; it is a 
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world of consent; it is a world of contracts and social development. Confrontation is essential for 
the creation of these “artificial” developments. 
Confrontation reveals testimony and, with differing testimonies, integrity. This is because 
all “consent” starts with the identification of positions of conflict. Locke thought that conflicts 
produced developments.  He called these developments “consent.”85  Locke writes:  
And hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics.  
For certainty being but the perception of the agreement of disagreement of our ideas, and 
demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other 
ideas or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes 
themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas; all the agreement or disagreement 
which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical 
figures.86   
Conflicts produce discussions. These discussions move from disagreements to agreement.  These 
agreements are real “knowledge” and as certain as mathematics.87 For Locke, each person’s 
knowledge—each testimony—stabilizes and validates the agreement.   
Differing opinions and perspectives are helpful because they advance knowledge.  “To 
understand” or “to know” is to agree together about something.  It is upon agreement, “consent,” 
that “a commonwealth is built.”88 Locke believed that civilization was a result of a process of 
moving from disorder to order, of moving from disagreement to agreement. This process of 
agreement is called “developmentalism.”89 Thus for Locke, society and education90 were not 
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ever “complete”; rather, they were more or less mature. Maturity did not mean “completion.”91   
For Locke, the process of philosophy was not an attempt to complete the system. It was just that: 
a process. We can see that a book like Tristram Shandy known for being “totally insane” is really 
just the first step in this rationalization process. 
 Locke’s task as a philosopher was to implement and teach the technique of this process.92  
The point of this process was to create shared beliefs (versus explaining what shared beliefs we 
do have).  Shared beliefs are the “public faces” of the private process and result from 
experiences.93 Shared experienced create shared beliefs. Locke writes:  
[T]here is nobody who does not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating 
the sun, as he has the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which 
two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are more distinguishable one from 
another.  And therefore he has certain knowledge that they are not both memory, or the 
actions of his mind, and fancies only within him; but that actual seeing has a cause 
without.94   
Experiencing the sun and believing something about it are intimately connected.  For Locke, 
experience and relations are not produced by ideas.  Ideas do not have a special power over and 
above dirt, apples, and sunny afternoons.  Ideas include rather than represent or correspond to 
things.95  Cope explains that for Locke, “The relation of perception [i.e., ideas] is not in an 
experience but as a kind of immediate, reflexive explanation of an experience.”96  This 
immediate, reflexive explanation of experience focuses Locke on testimony rather than data; 
similarly, Locke sought consent not “proof.”97   
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Beliefs are very closely related to actions.  When we believe certain things, we act in 
certain ways; when we act in certain ways, we believe certain things.98 This explains why Locke 
was not interested in proof or in giving a reader an analytic sense of what obligation a person had 
to “consent.” Rather than discuss abstract truth-claims, Locke wanted to discuss how society 
works. Cope writes: “Locke wants to talk about social processes not philosophical 
ruminations.”99  For example, Locke says: 
Unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would 
be capable of very little knowledge, though the bodies that affect us were as busy about 
us at they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking.  On this faculty 
of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several, 
even very general, propositions, which have passed for innate truths;--because men, 
overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly 
to native uniform impressions; whereas it is truth depends upon this clear discerning 
faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same, or different.100 
The knowing and consenting process is a technique of interacting with other people.  Interacting 
with other people, consenting and philosophizing are all other names for “work”; that is, the 
work of explaining is closely tied to the work of living.  Working out how you live and thinking 
about your life are closely tied. Thus, it can be said that Locke’s Essay is “the explanation mode 
in reverse.”101  Living produces thought and different lifestyles are necessary for different ideas.   
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In his Essay, Locke is showing how a person makes connections and produces relations 
or “discovers relations” and gives them to other people.102 This mode of explanation illumines 
why Voltaire has his characters work, but does not take time to explain why or how Candide is 
no longer “hesitating” but has resolved his dilemma. Work itself will resolve the dilemma. Like 
the Essay, Candide teaches how this reverse-mode works instead of proving that it is right.  
Candide teaches us how to focus on work and build meaning and hope into our lives.  
 
Candide’s Work 
This “reverse-mode” challenges anyone who believes that pain is the ultimate evil. In the 
reverse-mode, failure teaches the path that we should tread. For Locke and Voltaire, failure 
stabilizes, critiques and helps define the concepts we believe. The reverse-mode helps reveal the 
integrity of a belief. In systematicity, Voltaire sought integrity, not proof. He focuses on failure 
not to break metaphysical connections but to reveal the integrity of those connections (if they do 
exist). He uses a metaphor—versus a proposition—to draw the reader into revealing his or her 
own belief about metaphysical connections (i.e. his or her own testimony). Voltaire’s job is to 
draw out our testimony. Once we offer our testimonies, the rationalization has started.  
This is essential for Candide: Habitual actions (like “cultivation”) create the possibility of 
holding previously untenable beliefs (like, for example, Optimism).103 The habit of cultivation 
can produce a belief in Optimism, but Optimism cannot stand alone.  Concepts require a 
foundation in the body and in human practice.  In Locke’s world, we can “believe to know” just 
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as we can “know to believe.” It is work which produces purpose, pleasure and meaning.  The 
work we do changes what we know about the world; it is through “cultivation” that life takes on 
meaning. Before Candide starts cultivating, he has no hope, no faith, and no active belief in 
Optimism.  It is work itself that produces these beliefs.  In Candide, there is no certainty before 
faithful work.  
 
Meals 
Testimony, not data or an individual’s desire, begins knowledge. Candide must fit his 
desire to the world to “make sense” out of himself and his desires. That his desire fails is not a 
problem: failure reveals an ill-fit of desire to the world. As a result of failure, he must adopt a 
new habit. He must reshape his desire to correctly fit the world.  
As the garden community comes together at the end of the tale, they begin to pool their 
mutual needs and “cultivate” ways of sating their desires.  Happiness becomes a matter of 
consent, not violent, individualistic “grasping.” Candide notices that meals provide differing 
fulfillments; their fulfillment does not require the destruction of any one person’s desire—meals 
are systems of relationship that balance and fulfill mutually.  Like gardens, meals supply an 
assortment of fulfillments.  At the end of Candide, Candide seeks to “cultivate” non-violent 
assortments of fulfillment: meals. 
 “Cultivating a garden” becomes a metaphor for fitting human desire to the world. Just as 
the stomach is made for food, humans are made to fulfill their desires.104  This fulfillment occurs 
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happy with anything. “The best stomachs,” Martin points out, “are not those which refuse all food” (65). And, 
“There is no pleasure in having no pleasure” he tells Candide (65). With this scenario, Voltaire helps to capture 
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through agreement. Agreement begins with testimony and shared, public performance. Candide 
is an exploration of how fulfillment is possible. Cultivating a garden will produce food; food will 
produce a meal; meals, as we shall see, will produce hope and agreement with Optimism.105  
Candide realizes the need for meals when he meets the Turk.  They discuss politics.  
They sit down to a meal; they eat.  The Turk’s daughters attend them and perfume their beards 
after the meal:  
You must posses, Candide said to the Turk, an enormous and splendid property?  I have 
only twenty acres, replied the Turk; I cultivate them with my children, and the work 
keeps us from three great evils, boredom, vice and poverty.  Candide, as he walked back 
to his farm, meditated deeply over the words of the Turk.  He said to Pangloss and 
Martin: --This good old man seems to have found himself a fate preferable to that of the 
six kings with whom we had the honor of dining.”106 
Candide makes a connection between ethical action, philosophy, and food; he finds the key to 
stabilizing his own desires and helping his desires fit the world: meals.  “Cultivation” of meals 
through a diverse array of forces—money, marketplace, labor, sexuality, etc.—balance all the 
various aspects of human life.  Fulfillment comes “indirectly” to human life, or from “the ground 
up.”  Happiness is reached through a reverse-mode.  
 
Conclusion 
 Eighteenth-century “body” emphasis led Locke to focus attention on how the process of 
consent happened. He focused on testimony not proof. The Essay shows us a “reverse-mode” of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Candide’s dilemma for the reader. Candide is unsuccessful in his desire for Cunegonde, but he would be wrong to 
desire nothing. 
105
 Candide, 44. “After a good meal, Candide was inclined to agree with Pangloss.” 
106
 Candide, 71. 
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explanation where explanations, abstractions and meaning-giving systems begin with the body. 
The integrity of a testimony that recounts the explorer’s adventure is more important than the 
quantity or rigor of data compiled. The human body, not the laboratory, is the first step in the 
eighteenth-century criteria of certainty. As a result of this influence, it is no surprise to find that 
Candide focuses on the body and the body’s habits. Habits, not immediate, unadulterated 
impressions, bring about the connection between self and world. Habits bring about fulfillment.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Deo erexit Voltaire. 
-Voltaire 
 
Hesitation 
Introduction 
To further develop Locke’s concepts in order to illumine Candide, we will see that 
Locke’s concept of uneasiness reveals how, in the “reverse-mode,” volition and judgment 
interconnect. More to the point: A novelist who aligns himself with Locke’s epistemology, 
instead of Rousseau’s, will create a novel distinctly different than those novels that seek to 
capture the three-dimensional, emotional vitality of the main character. A “Lockean novel” will 
teach “hesitation” as the reader learns to study the relationship between judgment and volition. In 
a Lockean novel, the reader is encouraged to “step-back” or “hesitate” with respect to immediate 
impulses. This means that in a novel like Candide the attainment of happiness is a technical 
problem rather than an emotional or “desire” problem. In a Lockean novel, failure of desire does 
not coincide with a loss of being but is the condition for becoming fully human (i.e., thriving). 
 
Metaphor Versus Realism 
As we just saw, for Locke, outward-directed practices influence inward psychological 
processes. For Locke, sincerity and the “guts” of emotional or ideological commitments are not 
as important as “outward,” shared behavior. That is, the performance of the body amends the 
content of the mind. This is to say that for Locke affirming a behavior is more important than 
identifying a correct emotional response. Locke’s reverse-mode reveals itself very expressively 
in Candide’s overall behavior and particularly in the metaphor the text advances. Particularly, we 
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can see Candide’s uniqueness as a novel107 when we compare Candide’s “symbolic text”108 to 
the “emotional realism” of a novel by Rousseau.109 
As we will see, the rejection of Locke’s political metaphor of consent is not an isolated 
rejection of metaphor. Authors and philosophers after Locke and Voltaire affirm, at least 
unconsciously, the rejection of metaphor in exchange for the clarity of emotional realism. 
Artistic practice follows the rest of modernity by taking Rousseau as its ideological inspiration 
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instead of Locke or Voltaire.110 The practice of expressing the three-dimensional emotional 
realism of a main character—as Rousseau does—aims to capture an analytic sense of what a 
rational human is thinking or feeling. Candide is striking because this documentation of his 
“inwardness” is exactly what we do not get. For Modern thought following the eighteenth 
century, secret thoughts and feelings are more valuable than performance or outward-directed 
social processes like testimony and consent.  
It is true that Rousseau’s emphasis to express “emotional vitality” does help overcome a 
certain kind of epistemological dilemma (are these emotions sincere? Are they justified? Are my 
beliefs true?). But Candide’s metaphor offers us a different kind of solution to the modern 
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epistemological dilemma: As we will see, the different approaches coincide with different 
understandings of “human nature.” 
 
Three-Dimensional, Emotionally Realistic Novels 
Critics point out that Candide is not really a novel because the story does not have the 
“three-dimensional emotional vibrancy characteristic of other novels.”111  An analysis of 
“emotional vibrancy” reveals how Voltaire is in conflict with the novel tradition that came after 
him. Candide is distinctly flat and artificial. Part of the superficial style that Voltaire expresses in 
the story comes by way of the narrator—or better, “Demonstrator”—who is said to “perform” 
the work and thereby infect the audience with his own attitude towards the represented 
objects.112 Candide’s audience adopts the Demonstrator’s view of the events; the audience does 
not resonate with the life of the characters. Instead the audience resonates with a posture or a 
“distance” encouraged by the Demonstrator. Like a puppet master, this Demonstrator infects 
Candide with artificiality—two-dimensionality—and invites the audience to share a feeling of 
aloofness and superiority.113  The aloofness that the Demonstrator encourages renders Candide 
himself, as a character, flat and emotionally unappealing.  This would be problematic for 
Rousseau, and others, as truth comes by way of feeling and a loss of feeling coincides with a loss 
of being.114  But for Voltaire, this emotional disengagement or “distance” from immediate events 
is essential for answering epistemological dilemmas. 
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I connect Wolper’s argument back to Rousseau because, as Copleston comments, for Rousseau, “to exist is 
to feel; our feeling is undoubtedly earlier than our intelligence, and we had feelings before we had ideas” 
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Bonneville stresses the Candide’s “flatness,” and actually compares the text to a poem: 
“As with a poem,” he explains, “the value [of Candide] is evocative.”115  Bonneville continues, 
“Voltaire […] believes that the further one is from direct experience, the more comprehensible it 
becomes.”116  That is, Voltaire thought that getting some “distance” from a situation would help 
make that situation more comprehensible. This belief is in stark contrast to Rousseau, who 
thought truth was in a first impression.117 
Bonneville explains that Voltaire, to help attain a distance from direct experience, distorts 
time or “duration.”  Bonneville writes, “Since duration is largely emotional, its absence serves to 
heighten the intellectuality of Voltaire’s world.”118  Without duration, Voltiare creates a world 
with very little emotion. He creates a “flat” world, a world of two-dimensional, puppet-like 
                                                                                                                                                             
rather than feeling in the sense in which the sentiment of pity is a feeling” (78). Wolper condemns Candide because 
he no longer spontaneously responds to the world outside of his garden. As we will see, “hesitation” is an idea that 
directly opposes Rousseau’s belief in “feelings” (i.e. immediate apprehension) as being existence itself. 
115
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characters that the audience should analyze, laugh at, mock and do anything but resonate with 
emotionally. This is fundamentally important for understanding Voltaire and Locke: If duration 
is distorted, then we necessarily distort the presentation of emotion. To achieve his purposes of 
“distance,” Voltaire had to treat emotions fundamentally different than Rousseau. Emotions and 
all immediate responses only add to epistemological dilemmas, they do not help solve them.  
By way of comparison, Bonneville observes that Rousseau’s Novelle Heloise was 
published at the same time as Candide and offers novel critics a problem because of the obvious 
“formal range” that these two novels exhibit.119  Bonneville points out, “Rousseau’s ‘novel’ is 
personalized to the extreme […] while Voltaire’s work is the very epitome of depersonalized 
experience, for [in Voltaire] emotional intensive and psychological intricacy are purposefully 
minimized.”120  Following from Rousseau, the nineteenth-century French tradition overwhelmed 
the novel with Romanticism, Realism, and Naturalism.121  As a result, “Candide’s technical 
lessons were thus obscured as the novel tended to amplify the personal and particular.”122  
Bonneville argues that this difference in Candide forces us to approach the text differently than 
we approach Rousseau’s novels.  We do not “resonate” with the hero; rather, we resonate with 
the hero’s dilemma.   
Bonneville writes, “Once again, what is vital in Candide is not the person of the hero, it is 
his dilemma.”  All novels are about epistemological dilemmas. Novels dominate artistic 
expressions when epistemology becomes the dominant discipline.123 Rousseau and Voltaire both 
invite the reader to share the main character’s dilemma; what is important in all novels is how 
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the reader is supposed to share in the solution to the dilemma. For Voltaire, the solution is 
disengagement, or “distance” from emotion and immediate responses. 
Bonneville continues, “The objectivity, or objectification striven for in the new novel is 
accomplished in Candide, for intellectual identification is achieved with minimal physical or 
psychological involvement.”124  The technical nature of Candide’s dilemma is itself difficult to 
grasp as postmodern scholarship itself is steeped in Rousseau’s thought.  To understand 
Candide’s dilemma we must understand “human nature” differently than Rousseau does.  This 
difference can be seen in human volition and the technical, intellectual lessons our wills must 
learn. That is, conflicts of desire should not be fled from; rather, conflicts of will teach a person 
about their ignorance and how to overcome it. Happiness, in Candide, results from adopting new 
habits.  
 
Candide’s Dilemma 
The novel, as a dominant genre of a particular age, only develops when knowledge 
replaces memory as the “source of power for the creative impulse.”125  We see the novel rising 
out of a culture dominated by oral tradition (where memory was prized above information). The 
novel becomes the dominant genre when epistemology becomes the dominant discipline126 
because it is determined by “experience, knowledge and practice.”127 The novel explores the 
development of an individual and the attempts made by that individual to become happy. Of 
course, there are different ways of conducting this exploration. Rousseau and Voltaire each have 
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their own way of engaging the epistemological dilemma that accompanies modern life. They 
each thought happiness came about in different ways. 
A novel presents the reader with a dilemma via excessive information.  To make sense of 
the whirligig world, the reader must assimilate and control the information. The reader must read 
the novel just as life must be “read.” Thus Candide inspires disconnection, indeterminacy, and a 
“semantic open-endedness” characteristic of all novels128 and challenges knowledge, dogma, and 
all meaning-giving systems by leaving the reader in doubt about the meaning of the text.  Doubt 
about the text coincided with doubt about one’s own life. A novel helps the reader overcome 
challenges to epistemology by being analogous to the reader’s real life.  Of course, how Candide 
is analogous to life is different than Rousseau’s analogy. The two styles are different because 
each assumes something different about what “human being” is and how life should be engaged. 
One expresses the inner thoughts and feelings of the main character; the other ignores thoughts 
and feelings to better express cause and effect relations. For one, truth is tied to immediate, 
emotional responses; for the other, truth relates to perception, judgment and volition.  
In Candide, the epistemological dilemma reaches a crescendo at the end when Candide 
tells everyone to “cultivate your garden.”  Instead of feeling at peace with a concluding 
statement, the audience is left wondering if Candide’s motivation to cultivate his garden is 
nihilistic, despairing, apathetic, or hopeful.129  Is he a hero?  Is he a fool? Although we can see 
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his outward performance, we do not know his motivations—the guts—of his behavior. The 
interpretive confusion concerning Candide’s motive is essential to the story and to Candide’s 
“novel-ness,” but one can quickly see that this dilemma is dramatically different than other 
novels. In a novel by Rousseau, we would have insights into the emotional life of the main 
character that would tell us what he meant by “cultivation.” His motivation would be more 
important than his performance. 
 
Lockean Hesitation 
Candide encourages “distance” from sense data; said another way, Candide encourages 
us to “step back” from ourselves—just as we “step back” from an emotional engagement of the 
text. In a word, Candide encourages us to “hesitate.” The text teaches us the importance of 
distrusting immediate impulses in preference for acting upon judgment. Most scholars associate 
Candide’s hesitation with his denial of metaphysical claims. This is not necessarily the case. The 
presence of hesitation in the text reveals an important feature of Locke’s thoughts on volition and 
what forces shape our decision-making processes.  
In summary, Chappell writes that “volition,” for Locke, “is one kind of thought.”130 This 
means that, for Locke, “a being that is able to will must have a faculty of understanding and so 
be capable of cognitive thought, and indeed rationality.”131 This is dramatically important for 
understanding Candide’s hesitation. In taking the position that volition was intellectual, Chappell 
observes, Locke aligned himself, “perhaps unwittingly,” with Thomas Aquinas for whom this 
very point is so central.132 
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For Locke, like Aquinas and Aristotle, what determines the will serves both as an 
efficient cause (prompting the agent to act) and as a formal cause (an available option, or specific 
action that directs one’s will).133 This means that each person must judge and seek out the 
perceived way to satisfy his or her own will.  In this, Locke is both an egoist and a hedonist.134 
Personal happiness is the highest good and, Chappell writes, it is happiness which “determines 
the will.”135 Volition is stimulated and defined by available choices; each choice is a potential 
way for attaining the ultimate end of one’s life, happiness. So judgment and desire work together 
to analyze options and move toward what will bring about happiness. For Locke, “goodness” 
depends upon perception and it is perception that motivates the will to reach out for a desired 
end. As a result, Chappell writes, “what is best” is synonymous with “what will or is likely to 
produce or lead to the most pleasure for a person, either in the next moment or at some time in 
                                                                                                                                                             
will is appetitive and therefore cannot be understood apart from its natural object of desire. The natural object of 
desire, for Aquinas is beatitude, happiness or “the good” in general. Because the will and knowledge relate, humans 
can turn away from assenting that something is good. Humans can reject a possible good as being good. For 
example, a human can turn away from assenting that an argument for God’s existence is adequate. In Aquinas, the 
will and the mind are connected; judgment and appetites interconnect. But there is no compelling, necessary 
connection between “the good” and the particular means to attain “the good” (i.e. one man will say God is the 
ultimate good while another man will way, “no, God is not the ultimate good.”). This means that humans can see 
each particular life-situation from “different sides.” Every situation, and every desire, can be interpreted as either 
bad or good (that is, ultimately leading—or not leading—to “the good”). Copleston explains, for Aquinas, 
“Judgment belongs to reason, but freedom of judgment belongs immediately to the will.” And, “Because knowledge 
is sensual, we cannot have knowledge of mom-sensual objects. We cannot have metaphysical knowledge.”  
The connection between Locke and Aquinas is important because for both thinkers humans are free to 
prove God’s existence or to disprove God’s existence. We can affirm that metaphysical connections do or do not 
exist. With respect to Candide, we can argue that Candide’s failed desire proves metaphysical connections do not 
exist; or, we can argue that Candide’s failed desire teaches a lesson about how to “thrive” as a human. Ultimately, 
the reader’s own act of will in applying judgment to the text is the hinge upon which an interpretation swings.  
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the future.”136 While Locke might be an egoist and hedonist, he also admits that choices are not 
always easy to differentiate. It is possible that an immediate perceived good might not satisfy 
“best.” That is, what is perceived to be “best” might actually be the result of ignorance. Thus, 
Locke proposes a concept of “uneasiness.”137  
“Uneasiness” is a constant state of mind that results from desire. To explain: Humans are 
always developing their self-fulfillment. There is always an absent good from our lives. 
“Uneasiness” is the result of the potential loss of present pleasure and the arrival of new pain.138 
The possibility of greater good includes the possibility of loss of what little goodness one already 
possesses. Freedom, then, for Locke, is not simply a matter of the “will” reaching out for a 
desired object. Objects of desire all look good, and, as a result, humans suffer from indecision. 
We do not know whether an action will bring about more self-fulfillment or lessen our 
fulfillment. The world contains nothing that is pristinely desirable; everything is a shade of good.  
Locke writes that uneasiness determines any voluntary action.139 The choices we make 
are not just a matter of the will but are the result of the perceived goodness of the desired object. 
Desires themselves—and human volition—can be weak, strong, mature or immature. For Locke, 
feelings, emotions, ignorance and heredity help determine the will. Impressions, inclinations, 
enjoyment and all the “subjective babble” of human experience shape human choices. Unlike 
Socrates, Chappell writes, the will for Locke is weak, insecure, and unsure of itself.140 Humans 
are profoundly indecisive by Locke’s account.  
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But there is hope for the indecisive will: These multiple choices allow humans to suspend 
the will entirely. Humans are free to “hesitate.”141 The power to hesitate allows humans to keep 
the decision making process from being merely affective.  Hesitation allows us to act only on 
“mature impulses.” Through hesitation Locke thought we could keep our desires from 
determining our wills; we can shape desires to produce the most healthful results for our 
communities and ourselves. Hesitation allows us the time to develop our weak wills. We can 
culture new habits in ourselves that help us engage the world and thereby attain happiness. 
Of course this suspension of desire is brief,142 but it allows one a chance to judge a 
situation with greater skill. A human’s desire changes with suspended action; after suspension, a 
situation takes on a new perspective. A weak, immature desire may die or develop into maturity. 
Through suspension of the will, humans can shape their desires and thus determine their own 
wills.143 As a result, this hesitation is the source of all liberty.144 Hesitation allows one to escape 
an impulse as well as entirely deny the importance or legitimacy of an impulse. 
For Locke, volition and judgment intimately relate. Humans can “turn away” from what 
they judge to be in inappropriate means to happiness. One’s ignorance or one’s knowledge of the 
world shapes what good one seeks to attain. As with Candide’s desire for Cunegonde, he cannot 
be chastised for wanting her. According to Locke, the will is appetitive and, therefore, cannot be 
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understood apart from the context within which it finds itself. Candide cannot seek “a woman” in 
general; he seeks the one woman who stimulated his desire. But he is able to interpret his desire 
for her as being either good or bad.145 That he desires her is not enough to prove her goodness for 
him. His desire for her might not be the best path to his happiness, but it might be. The lesson in 
the text is that the impulse to attain Cunegonde is not the gauge of truth; an immediate impulse 
can be interpreted as being good or evil. 
As we will see later, this freedom to interpret a desired object as either good or evil is 
precisely the cause for both Candide’s and the reader’s dilemma. Candide must interpret his 
world and decide if he will cultivate. When he does decide to cultivate, the reader must decide to 
what good Candide is directing himself. The reader questions, “How is cultivation going to bring 
about happiness?” Or, “To what happiness is this cultivation aimed?” Rather than answer this 
question for us, Candide shows us this dilemma. As a novel, Candide represents an analogous 
situation the reader faces in his or her own life: “What will bring about my own happiness?” And 
although we see the performance of cultivation, we do not know to what good this cultivation is 
aimed. 
 
Eisegesis in Candide 
What is remarkable about Candide is how the text calls forth the reader’s own beliefs 
about the world in order to answer the dilemma. Said another way, Candide demands eisegesis. 
In “drawing out” the meaning of the text, the text “draws in” the reader’s understanding about 
the world. In keeping with Locke’s understanding of the woven relationship of volition and 
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judgment, in judging the text interpretatively, the reader inevitably imposes her will upon the 
text. Judgment and will coincide; to interpret is to move toward a perceived good. The reader 
interprets the “goodness” or “badness” of Candide’s act of cultivation. This interpretation is 
necessarily an act of volition and reveals the reader’s position or testimony.  
With some texts, eisegesis is damaging. For example, when a text is trying to prove a 
truth-claim. But this is not the case with Candide. Bonneville touches upon this idea when he 
explains that Candide is evocative in the same way that poetry evokes meaning from a reader’s 
personal experiences. Candide’s readers connect to the story not by emotional resonance, but by 
eisegesis. In Candide finding the correct reading of the text—of explaining what “cultivation” 
means “once and for all”—is beside the point. The point of the text is that we see our attempts at 
exegesis as eisegesis. The point of Candide, and how it helps readers engage the modern 
epistemological crisis, is by revealing to the reader the relationship between judgment and 
volition. Candide teaches its readers to become aware of the complexity of decision-making; 
Candide teaches that any interpretation is also a commitment of the will to affirm (or pursue) a 
certain kind of “goodness.” An act of criticism is a testimony of the critic’s life. 
What this means is that hesitation over metaphysical connections does not equal rejection 
of metaphysical connections. Hesitation allows for the adjustment of one’s desire towards a 
perceived good. When the will is engaged, hopefully a better solution to the problem will reveal 
itself. After we have “stepped back” from a situation, hopefully we can engage the situation with 
a well-informed judgment-will. If Candide’s cultivation signals the end of metaphysics, it is 
ourselves who have broken them, not the text. 
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Hesitation adjusts the emphasis humans place on the “inside” of another person and 
instead focuses attention on public behavior. Public behavior will necessarily influence and 
shape—according to Locke’s view—the secret insides of each individual member of society. 
“Secret insides” adjust because of the reverse-mode of explanation; ideas include things. 
Performance, by itself and without “sincerity,” efficaciously produces sincerity later. By 
analogy, “Loving” one’s neighbor is virtuous whether or not you “feel” like loving your 
neighbor. For Locke, the performance of love is enough. Unlike Kant and Rousseau,146 the 
motive for Love is not “duty.” It is an attempt to make public life thrive. Love is active and 
positive versus the negative, duty-oriented moral code, which emphasizes one’s own emotions or 
one’s own understanding on what reason dictates. For Locke, the performance of love is enough; 
the feeling of love—the sincerity—will follow the act. Also, the actual positive, “outward” 
expression of love is the point, not the inward duty. “Love” is actively cultivating a thriving 
community not acting according to your duty.  
Voltaire offers us a solution to frustrating, dilemma-riddled situation. Humans are free to 
suspend commitment, but can seek productive action on other fronts. If we are aware that 
interpretations are also willful commitments to perceived goods, we can learn to suspend our 
wills (that is, hesitate). Humans are free briefly to suspend commitment to Leibniz while still 
committing to cultivate a garden. 
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Integrity 
Candide problematizes interpretation. Postmodern “anti-science” scholars will glory in 
this while conservative scholars will complain that forcing readers into eisegesis is not helpful. 
But Candide, along with eighteenth-century satire, is “aggregative and integrative rather than 
strictly conservative and didactic.”147 Instead of arguing for a position over and above some 
other position, Candide encourages many, many positions and readings. These readings coincide 
with different “perceived goods.” Such proliferation is a sign of how Voltaire thought certainty 
arose, or was “wrung,” from confusion. Certainty was not reached only through rigorous 
experiment; it was reached through testimony and consent. The admittance of testimony and 
consent into any criterion of certainty heralds a shift from “proof” to “integrity” as the goal of 
the discourse.  
 
“Taste” and Integrity 
If satire is the “process of finding meaningful measures between abstract form and 
irrefragable meaning,”148 then satire’s job is to explore the space between a principle (example, 
“This is the best of all possible worlds”) and the particular human who holds this position—a 
person who has syphilis or has unhappily married an ugly woman.  Satire is this process of 
finding these measurements.  Satire does not prove the rightness or wrongness of Leibniz for 
example; rather, satire helps us relate Leibniz to life, to see if Leibniz, in fact, “makes sense” 
given our position within the world. Through the world of Candide, Voltaire shows how volition 
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and judgment relate. The “meaningful measurements” between abstract ideas and particular 
human lives relate to “perceived good.” 
When a reader begins to see how judgment and volition relate, she will develop a sense 
of her personal taste. Satire teaches readers to focus attention on important data and so cultivate 
taste.149 What data we do focus on reveals our own commitments. In humans, “taste” and 
“stereotypes” are very similar: Both are basically “a template under which similar data can be 
conveniently conjugated.”150  Dr. Kevin Cope points out that stereotypes are “the stock and trade 
of satire.  They stand between the two great branches of cognitive theory: “modeling” (devising a 
theory about the structure of the world and then acting on it) and heuristics (doing whatever 
works with little regard for its metaphysical foundations).”151  Satire’s way of positioning itself 
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between these two ways of answering problems explains Candide’s constant hesitation as he 
deliberates over Pangloss’ models and Martin’s heuristic approach to existence.152  Candide has 
an ambiguous ending because it is functioning exactly like satire always functions: It bombards 
the reader with information and forces the reader to filter this information, to take a side, to 
develop a model or act heuristically.153 How we solve the problem reveals taste. The act of 
judging the text is an act of the will or a movement towards a perceived good.154 It seems then 
that we can interpret better or worse than one another, and these degrees reveal our errors. We 
can be misinformed or immature or have perverse appetites with unhealthy consequences. 
Whatever our interpretations, they reveal our appetites and preferences. It can be said tat the best 
reading will have the best results for the whole community. 
 
An Example from Voltaire’s Life 
“Taste” helps us understand Voltaire’s behavior as a satirist. For example, we can see 
how he explored the meaningful relationship between abstraction and himself when he erected a 
church on his own property at Ferney. Upon the building Voltaire ensconced a placard that read: 
“Deo erexit Voltaire.”155  We can see his exploration of the “meaningful measures” between 
“man-made” religion versus “God-breathed” religion. While seeing his wit, we can observe 
Voltaire’s satiric position between “modeling” and “heuristics.”  He expresses the conflict 
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between objective truth and the subjective experience of objectivity; he does not “explain” 
anything.  He merely expresses the conflict.  
Voltaire’s actions in mounting this placard are those of satire: Satire does not attempt a 
purely objective approach by straight away discussing the object of analysis.  Rather satire 
achieves objectivity by “culturing ideas and motifs in different media.”156  Satire is not good at 
presenting issues “objectively”; satire is good at discovering “myriad manifestations of self-
similar viciousness.”157  Satire is good at showing again and again the same “universal” error.158  
Satire, like Candide and Voltaire’s placard, does not challenge the existence of God or whether 
or not scripture is divine. Satire challenges the integrity of the church being there at all.   Satire 
asks: is this church actually “for” God as worship or merely an expression of man’s power and 
the dominance of a few over the many? Our answer to this question is our own testimony: It is 
ourselves, not satire, which proves—through testimony and consent—that metaphysical 
connections are broken or not. 
We see that God gives us power to build; or, we see that God need not exist at all for we 
can build for ourselves: “We build for God” settles itself between these two interpretations. Our 
interpretation of this phrase reveals our own commitments to what we perceive as “good.” To 
become aware of this conflict we must disengage emotionally; we must hesitate.  We must 
consider where we ourselves stand in relation to work and God.  
 
 
                                                 
156
 Cope, “Algorithmic,” 359. 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Ibid., 362. To reveal the “universal error,” satire has to disrupt a “habit-saturated experience” like going 
to church or reading a story and trying to derive a lesson from it.  Cope writes: “All minds have ad hoc cognitive 
traditions [like asking to distinguish between games and seriousness].  Conservative, they hesitate to change their 
approaches to experience.  Long-term but not unchangeable, habits of mind account both for the mind’s 
susceptibility to surprise and for its flexibility—its ability to make new traditions […].  Satire exploits the mind’s 
habit of reifying its habits.  [… .] The best satirists befuddle habit-forming readers” (363).   
59 
Textual Evidence 
By quickly looking at a sequence of murders Candide perpetrates, we can better 
understand how Voltaire is encouraging us to participate with Candide’s technical dilemma, 
rather than resonate with him emotionally.  Also we will see how this technical dilemma relates 
to the “integrity” of positions instead of “proving” any particular position.  
When Candide meets Cunegonde after the auto-da-fe in Spain, she is currently making a 
decent wage by renting her virtues to the Grand Inquisitor and a Jew.  After Candide kills both of 
them in a moment of confusion, Cunegonde exclaims: “How is it that you, who were born so 
gentle, could kill in two minutes a Jew and a prelate?”  Candide responds: “When a man is in 
love, jealous, and just whipped by the Inquisition, he is no longer himself.”159 Candide watches 
himself murder in the same way that the reader watches Candide murder. His response to his 
own actions is that of a surprised, disinterested observer.  
This emotional disengagement is increased later when Candide meets and kills 
Cunegonde’s brother after the Baron calls Candide an “insolent dog” for desiring Cunegonde.”160  
Candide and his servant, Cacambo, flee and the Demonstrator explains: “Candide and his valet 
were over the frontier before anyone in the camp knew of the death of the [Baron].  Foresighted 
Cacambo had taken care to fill his satchel with bread, chocolate, ham, fruit, and several bottles of 
wine.” That night they sit down to eat and rest, but Candide says: “How do you expect me to eat 
ham when I have killed […] the Baron, and am now condemned never to see the lovely 
Cunegonde for the rest of my life?”  The Demonstrator interjects: “Though [Candide] talked this 
way, he did not neglect the food.”161 Here the reader is further disengaged from Candide, who is 
himself experiencing an emotional disengagement from his second murder. He acts and feels in 
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dramatically different ways. Both the reader and Candide are becoming increasingly cool and 
intellectual about the events. As a result of this mutual disengagement, the reader and Candide 
himself share in the epistemological dilemma: What formal cause will bring about happiness? 
The emotional “distancing” does not end here: The reader and Candide draw further back 
from immediate emotional responses as the events unfold. Immediately after the conversation 
about the ham, “The two wanderers heard a few weak cries which … arose from two girls, 
completely naked, who were running swiftly along the edge of the meadow, pursued by two 
monkeys who snapped at their buttocks.  Candide was moved to pity; he had learned 
marksmanship with the Bulgars, and could have knocked a nut off a bush without touching the 
leaves.  He raised his Spanish rifle, fired twice, and killed the two monkeys.”162  The incident 
ends with Candide and his valet realizing that they have just murdered the women’s lovers.  This 
leaves Candide in a terrible intellectual muddle. Following his immediate emotional impulses 
was the wrong decision; his feelings betray him.  
This intellectual confusion is highlighted when, explaining why Candide should have 
known that the women were enjoying the monkey business, Cacambo says: “You see how 
people make mistakes who haven’t received a measure of education.”163 Cacambo points out that 
Candide’s evil actions are not tied to too much education—and too much social influence—but 
to a lack of education and social influence. As the tale progresses, Candide hesitates more and 
more as he ties to discern how to act correctly. He “pulls back” from sincerity and emotional 
impulses.  
But, although greater experience erodes the certainty of his knowledge, his hesitation is 
not the result of the failure of “metaphysical connections” or because human life is “absurd.” He 
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hesitates because he is not sure how to bring about his own happiness. He hesitates because he is 
unsure of which formal cause will be the most efficacious in bringing about his “perceived 
good.” What is more, Candide also realizes that his perception of what is good and bad might be 
wrong. He hesitates so he can come to better conclusion about himself and his world. 
  
Cultural Evidence: Rococo  
Like the immediate impulses Candide learns to hold suspect, a “pulling back” from 
cultural expressions is also encouraged. To further understand how Candide explores the 
“meaningful measure” between life and principles or theories about life, an understanding of 
rococo is helpful.  Voltaire’s epic tragedies were an expression of an overall cultural sensibility 
that falls under the rococo style.164  This style exhibits itself most obviously in the lavish, 
pointless floral decorations seen in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French palaces. The 
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novel is perfect for an investigation of integrity because it includes itself in the attack upon 
convention165 and includes the author’s language in the objects parodied.166  Voltaire uses rococo 
language, but mocks this language; he parodies the impetus of his own fortune and influence.  
Such parody fits right into the form of the novel, which, as a form of literature, did not “rise” so 
much as “disintegrate” all the other genres.167  Specifically, the novel corrupted epic literature by 
parodying and inciting comic familiarity.168   
Candide’s overall style has been described by some critics as being rococo because, like 
the lavish style itself, Voltaire’s form dominates his content.169 “Rococo art” as the dominant 
eighteenth-century artistic expression, “reflects the spiritual paralysis of the parasitical, decadent 
aristocracy, which [had] no sense of responsible purpose, which [could] therefore only look back 
wistfully to the great age preceding it, which refus[ed] to grapple with ultimates or to make any 
serious commitments, and which [sought] escape from boredom by means of cynical or 
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much darker content, and that Voltaire obviously may or may not mean what he says.   
63 
Pyrrhonistic prose.”170  Voltaire used the emblem of his irresponsible time—with all its 
irresponsible dreaming—to challenge this same irresponsibility.  He asks how this value, this 
aesthetic, relates to life.  Voltaire creates a violent, frivolous tale to express the relationship and 
test the fidelity of his culture. Knowing the rococo style is helpful in seeing that, in Candide, 
Voltaire is using a dominant convention of his age to move beyond this same convention.  Or 
said another way, satire allows Voltaire the medium by which to explore the relationship 
between this style and the real world that the audience lives in.   
Like Voltaire does with rococo, satire bombards the reader with information, with the 
epic ideal or the values of any particular age.  Such a bombardment forces the reader to filter this 
information, to take a side in relation to this information, to develop a model of rationality that 
explains the information or to act heuristically.171  The style and frivolity of Candide clearly is an 
expression of rococo, but this same style and frivolity draws attention to what is happening in the 
real world just outside the gate.  In effect, the audience sits and laughs at how they are sitting and 
laughing while people are starving outside.  
 
Example from a Critic 
The inability to see how Candide challenges integrity leads some scholars to demand 
only one reading of the text; they want to prove their position over and above another position. 
For example, one Candide scholar in particular hopes to use serious, rigorous reading skills to 
secure a single reading, a single meaning to the tale.  Bottiglia summarizes various divergent 
readings of Voltaire and says: “This variety of learned opinions makes it plain that there is 
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something wrong here [in Candide], either with Voltaire or with his readers.”172  Bottiglia 
connects these many interpretations with a failure to communicate.  Many meanings are wrong; 
there can be only one.  He writes: “Voltaire’s readers, not Voltaire, have created the problem 
posed by the conclusion of the tale.”173  The reason, he says, for this difference is, first, 
inattention to what other critics have said and, second, differences in approach and method.  He 
writes,  
No critic with whose work I am acquainted had probed the meaning of the Conclusion by 
analyzing it rigorously and exclusively in vacu, i.e. without reference to its biographical 
and historical backgrounds.  Some of the interpretations listed are appreciations set down 
by ‘empirics’; some are evaluations arrived at by historians of ideas—the former, 
however much endowed with aesthetic sensitivity, lack method.  Through the years, by 
gradual exposure and trial-and-error observation, they have developed an often 
perceptive, but not always dependable, intuitive taste.  The later have method, but they 
tend to treat the work of art as though it were simply another historical document.  In 
theory they may pay lip-service to the idea that Candide must be studied with a due 
respect for its literary form and content.  In practice they violate its artistic integrity.174 
Of course an aesthetic that values only serious, disinterested analysis will not see that a 
proliferation of readings is the first step in Satire’s “aggregative and conservative” process. If 
satire is meant to reveal integrity of the reader’s position, it certainly has done just that. Bottiglia 
reveals his own commitment to solve hermeneutic and epistemological problems through 
rigorous and disinterested research. Candide helps us see his commitment. 
 
Conclusion 
Candide’s poetic language, which culminates in the mysterious “cultivation” metaphor, 
draws out the reader into engaging Candide’s dilemma. An emotionally “three-dimensional” 
novel does not challenge a reader in this way. The metaphor forces us to hesitate. Hesitation 
teaches us how to shape our desires and work toward public good. Cope writes, “Satirists pine 
                                                 
172
 Bottiglia, 100. 
173
 Ibid. 
174
 Ibid. 
65 
after Edenic gardens, but none expects or even wants their return, for the vector of both 
civilization and satire points in only one way: forward.”175  Part of this “forward movement” is to 
“tune up” the skills of a scholar to read, to analyze “coherency.”  Satire encourages a “flexible, 
connectionist literary habit.”176  The scholar who approaches satire in search of a straightforward 
argument is missing the point.  “Satire,” Cope explains, “promotes a non-ideological criticism 
that relentlessly adjusts to deviant evidence.” 177 Satire teaches the process of how consent results 
when divergent testimonies perceive agreement.  
For the body to be able to “shape” concepts and for belief to influence knowledge, 
volition must be connected to judgment.  The reverse-mode reveals how our own judgments are 
acts of will, not just the cool, objective perceptions of an analytic reason. The eighteenth century, 
on the whole, believed that the passions moved reason.178 
The eighteenth-century satirist used the body as a tool to explore the void. Voltaire has 
aligned himself with Locke’s epistemology, stressed the outwardness of performance and left the 
reader to interpret the motivation of this performance. The concept of uneasiness helps us 
understand that judgment and will interconnect. To interpret Candide’s performance means we 
must reveal what we perceive to be good. Candide encourages us to judge our immediate 
impulses rather than to obey them. This means that the attainment of happiness is a technical 
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problem rather than an emotional or “desire” problem. In a Lockean novel, failure of desire does 
not coincide with a loss of being but is the condition for becoming fully human (i.e., thriving). 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Candide was inclined to agree with Pangloss  
especially after a good meal.179 
-Voltaire 
 
Textual Evidence 
Introduction 
The reverse-mode and “hesitation” reveal themselves most obviously in Candide’s meals. 
The text stresses the failure of human desire. To highlight failure, the text constantly interrupts 
itself and refuses to offer the reader an analytic sense of what motivates the final action of the 
tale. Rather than participate in judgment-making, the text draws attention to the relationship 
between judgment and volition. Because of the interrelationship between judgment and volition, 
adopting new habits (i.e., changing behavior) can lead to human flourishing. The most important 
habit Candide learns to adopt is the habit of eating meals with his friends. Meals are an 
expression of the reverse-mode and “hesitation” at work. 
 
Interruptions  
Candide encourages a “stepping back” or a “distancing” from the events of the story. 
Rather than enter the story and “resonate emotionally,” a reader draws back and analyzes the 
events. Performances that have mysterious motivations are one way that readers are “drawn in.” 
Another way the text draws in is through interruptions.  
There are a number of ways the text interrupts itself. Punctuation sometimes interrupts, 
while others times events and characters interrupt one another. In one way or another, 
interruptions reveal failure. As the story develops, the reader’s epistemological dilemma—and 
Candide’s—is intertwined with this failure to get what is desired. The interrupting text is itself an 
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example of life; the text represents how, although we aim at a particular good, humans are not 
always able to attain that good nor is this perceived good always best. 
As we have discussed, Candide’s desire for Cunegonde motivates the tale. He seeks the 
good pleasure of her body. Candide fails to enjoy the spontaneous pleasure associated with 
Cunegonde’s body, but he discovers other forms of spontaneous pleasure: meals. Meals are one 
of the many recurring, interrupting elements of the tale. Through meals (and their “cultivation”) 
the reader is given an opportunity to solve the problem of human desire. Meals relate intimately 
to the solution between volition and judgment; meals help us deal with faulty judgments and 
immature desires. By “cultivating” meals we develop habits of self-control that balance 
perceived goods with actual goods.  
 
Ellipses 
Voltaire goes to a lot of trouble to help the reader notice the habitual, yet still 
spontaneous, eating of meals.  The reader anticipates a conclusive statement or a resonance with 
the emotions of the main character. Instead the reader sees Candide perform a habit. Voltaire 
wants to teach “hesitation” and how volition and judgment interrelate.  There are various ways 
the tale interrupts itself, but the most obvious can be seen literally with a piece of punctuation: 
The ellipsis.180  Perhaps the best example of the “interrupting ellipsis” is on page forty-seven, 
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chapter twenty-one.  This chapter’s caption reads Martin and Candide Reason Together.  The 
conversation happens on a ship as they travel to Bordeaux where Candide hopes to hear word of 
his Cunegonde.  The conversation is a repetition of other conversations already recorded in the 
text.181  The conversation pertains to Leibniz and is central to knowing if Leibniz is “right or 
wrong” as it is Cunegonde they seek.  Here, an extended quotation is helpful: 
--By the way, said Candide, do you believe the earth was originally all ocean, as they 
assure us in that big book [the Bible] belonging to the ship’s captain? 
--I don’t believe that stuff, said Martin, nor any of the dreams which people have been 
peddling for some time now. 
--But why, then, was this world formed at all? Asked Candide. 
--To drive us mad, answered Martin. 
--Aren’t you astonished, Candide went on, at the love which those two girls showed for 
the monkeys in the land of the Biglugs that I told you about? 
--Not at all, said Martin, I see nothing strange in these sentiments; I have seen so many 
extraordinary things that nothing seems extraordinary any more. 
--Do you believe, asked Candide, that men have always massacred one another as they do 
today?  That they have always been liars, traitors, ingrates, thieves, weaklings, sneaks, 
cowards, backbiters, gluttons, drunkards, misers, climbers, killers, calumniators, 
sensualists, fanatics, hypocrites, and fools? 
--Do you believe, said Martin, that hawks have always eaten pigeons when they could get 
them? 
--Of course, said Candide. 
--Well, said Martin, if hawks have always had the same character, why do you suppose 
that men have changed? 
--Oh, said Candide, there’s a great deal of difference, because freedom of the will . . . 
As they were disputing in this manner, they reached Bordeaux.182 
                                                                                                                                                             
Critics have drawn every kind of conclusion about this, and it is possible to add to this wealth of 
interpretations by arguing that these interruptions are not meant to break metaphysical connections at all, but to find 
the integrity of these connections. Scholars like Bottiglia approach this historical “problem” with a renewed vigor 
for rigorous scientific scrutiny.  Bottiglia asks for “method” to be “applied.”  Other scholars say Candide means that 
life is “absurd” and that we should just “cope” with it—for example, Morris Weitz in Philosophy in Literature: 
Shakespeare, Voltaire, Tolstoy and Proust. Still other scholars say that Candide is an example of a “freed” modern 
scholar, a person no longer enslaved to the need to make metaphysical connections. 
All these interruptions—ellipses and non-ellipses—work together toward the same end: They all move the 
reader’s attention away from “reasoning together” toward an awareness of the context of this “reasoning together.”  
Some scholars find this “context-awareness” to mean that Voltaire was against metaphysical connections, but 
according to the behavior of satire, it is more likely Voltaire simply wanted to challenge the integrity of 
metaphysical claims.  It is we critics who reveal our own beliefs when we argue for or against metaphysical 
connections. 
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And so, abruptly, the chapter ends.  While Candide launches into his thoughts on “freedom of the 
will,” the Demonstrator183 of the tale silences the conversation with an ellipsis.  This ellipsis 
interrupts the conversation itself and the sailing adventure.184  This interruption communicates 
that nothing new happens intellectually or physically even though the characters are straining all 
their energy to make sense of their lives and to “get somewhere.”  They try to prove and disprove 
truth-claims. The Demonstrator cuts them off to draw attention to the fact that the characters are 
repeating themselves.  They circle the globe and circle concepts without being able to conclude: 
They fail. 
 What failure means is up for debate, but the broken adventures, with their broken 
conversations, ask readers to see the failure itself. We are asked to see the trajectory of the tale 
towards the goal and the failure to reach the goal.  It is important that the characters keep 
repeating snippets of conversation about Optimism and that they keep eating food and keep 
failing to reach their conclusions.  Eventually we can study this pattern of failure for what it is. 
 
Meals 
In a seventy-page story, meals pop up some forty-two times. That is, a meal occurs on 
every other page. They are pointless at first, but the repetition slowly builds meaning into the 
meals. Examples of interrupting meals are everywhere in the tale.  For example, a meal is the 
setting for Candide’s first moment alone with Cunegonde.  After eating, they meet behind a 
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curtain; they kiss.185 Candide is immediately thrown out of the castle.  A page later, Candide is 
hungry again.  Army officers offer him food; Candide begins his second meal of the tale.186 
Overjoyed by the generosity of the army officers, Candide accidentally joins the military. 
Candide finally escapes and, again seeking food, meets Jacques who helps him become 
financially stable.187 Candide, helping others find food, is reunited with Pangloss.188 And so the 
tale progresses at a wild pace.  As these examples show, meals act as catalysts for the adventure 
but also continually interrupt adventures. The reader is likely to skip over the meals in her haste 
to see if Candide reaches his goal of Cunegonde. 
By chapter twenty-six, meals have taken on special significance.  Chapter twenty-six is 
entitled About a Supper With Six Strangers and Who They Were.  During this “adventure,” 
Candide is excited to dine with six dethroned kings.  Candide hears their troubles and is actually 
able to lend a king money.  Later, Candide exclaims with excitement: “That was a most unlikely 
experience we had at Venice.  Nobody ever saw, or heard of, six dethroned kings eating together 
at an inn.”189  Martin, Candide’s pessimistic travel partner, responds, “It is not more 
extraordinary than most of the things that have happened to us [. . .] That [meal is] a trifle which 
does not deserve our notice.”190 Martin sees the meal as common an object as any other. Martin 
just tries to endure life, but Candide thinks the meal is of special significance.  Martin’s 
skepticism will not allow him to agree.  
By chapter twenty-six, we are encouraged to analyze the significance of the meal.  Meals 
help us overcome evil somehow. For Candide, meals are an important part of the answer to his 
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epistemological dilemma.  The reader is free to fall somewhere between these two readings of 
the meal: Maybe the meal is just another random item in the story, but maybe the meal is of 
special significance.  Either way, this is very different from how the reader “passes over” the first 
meals of the text.   
This “meal-focus” is further encouraged when Candide, a page before the final enigmatic 
conclusion, compares his meal-with-the-six-kings to the meal with the Turk.  The text reads, 
Candide “meditated deeply over the words of the Turk” and said to his friends: “This good man 
seems to have found himself a fate preferable to that of the six kings with whom we had the 
honor of dining.”191 Candide makes a connection between his meals.  His connection further 
encourages the reader to analyze meals as an important event that relates directly to human 
happiness (that is, to the attainment of one’s desire).  Although this may not be a metaphysical 
connection, it is a connection nonetheless, and Candide passionately holds to this connection and 
begins to cultivate like the Turk. The success or failure of metaphysical claims gets “covered 
over” as Candide focuses on eating food. He exchanges a search for Optimism with a search for 
good meals.  This shift is slow but it marks a break with the “goal-oriented” reading. The text 
affirms a metaphor instead of a truth-claim. 
 
The Problem of “Immediate” Impressions: An Example of “Love” 
 How we understand failure tells us about ourselves.  Whether failure breaks all 
metaphysical connections or teaches us about them, our readings of the text reveal our own 
metaphysical or anti-metaphysical commitments.  Integrity reveals itself in the face of failure.  
In Candide, the failure is total: linguistic, ethical and conceptual. Interestingly, Candide’s 
linguistic, ethical and conceptual failure coincides with Candide’s sincerity. His “immediate” 
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judgments—his lack of hesitation—leads to the failure of everything in his world. The most 
obvious example of this “total” failure is in the use of the word “love” throughout the tale. In 
fact, what “love” means becomes an underlying element of the tale. To discuss the treatment of 
“love” (aimer) opens our discussion to the multifarious decay Candide encounters. 
He wants it to be the best world, which for him means marrying his idol, his love, his 
Cunegonde. He wants Leibniz as whole-heartedly as he wants Cunegonde: the two are knit 
together for Candide. The textual interruptions keep Candide from getting his ideal love and 
from consistently believing Leibniz. Sincerity does not help; stronger commitments do not help. 
The word “love” keeps causing trouble.  During the second meal (and the first occurrence of an 
ellipsis), Candide has this painful conversation with a couple of army officers.  The army officers 
approach him in the hopes of recruiting him. This scene starts a theme of miscommunication that 
continues throughout the whole text: A gesture can mean more than the character wants it to and 
identical words are used in divergent ways in different contexts.  Bottiglia wants to overcome 
these ambiguities with heightened method.  But Voltaire presents another way of overcoming 
these problems: Meals.  Candide is, of course, thinking only of Cunegonde: 
They [the officers] beg him to accept a couple of crown, he takes them, and offers an 
I.O.U.; they won’t hear of it, and all sit down at table together.   
--Don’t you love dearly . . . ? 
--I do indeed, says [Candide], I dearly love Miss Cunegonde. 
--No, no, said one of the gentlemen, we are asking if you don’t love dearly the King of 
the Bulgars. 
--Not in the least, says he, I never laid eyes on him. 
--What’s that you say?  He’s the most charming of kings, and we must drink his health. 
--Oh, gladly, gentleman; and he drinks. 
--That will do, they tell him; you are now the bulwark, the support, the defender, the hero 
of the Bulgars; your fortune is made and your future assured. 
Promptly they slip irons on his legs and lead him to the regiment.192 
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For a few days Candide is not really sure how he became a hero in the army, but it is true.  He 
managed to communicate things that he did not mean.  This scenario is not singular.  Throughout 
the story, language refuses to behave seriously, reliably or with precision.  Love, as exemplified 
here, can mean more than one thing within the same context.  It is no wonder that scholars too 
have trouble discussing the tale with precision.  Love causes Candide a lot more trouble—as it 
will for any young man.  It is this trouble that causes scholars to argue that the tale breaks down 
metaphysical connections.193   
Just because Candide uses language sincerely does not mean anyone else does or, if they 
themselves are sincere, that they have the same sincere meaning.  Sincerity and “meaning well” 
are not enough for Candide’s problems. The immediate impulse to use the words “dearly love” 
                                                                                                                                                             
“tendrement”), their meanings are not the same.  The “dearly love,” although the same word, is not the same 
meaning for each person.  The army officers mean “loyalty to their sovereign” while Candide means “romantic 
love.”  The language here is not being used incoherently.  Both meanings of “dearly love” are possible given certain 
different contexts.  But that is the problem: Different context result in different meanings. 
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flogging at the Auto-da-fe, Cunegonde tells Candide: “My mind was full of the kiss which I gave you behind the 
screen, on the day I saw you for the last time” (Candide, 16).  We can take her expression at face value, but 
Cunegonde is working as a prostitute for a Jew and a priest. Her words and her life relate problematically.  Candide 
ignores this and rejoices in his “love.”  
Nelly Severin, “Hagiographic Parody in Candide,” The French Review, Vol. 50, No. 6. (May, 1977), 844. 
Severin argues that Cunegonde’s name comes from a saint who proved her fidelity by walking across red-hot 
plowshares barefoot.  Severin argues that Voltaire mocks virtue through this name.  Voltaire does mock, but the 
point is that religious virtue “fit” with life.   
After Candide kills the Jew and the priest, Candide, Cunegonde, and the old woman are forced to flee for 
South America.   As they travel, Cunegonde tells Candide, “I love you with all my heart” (Candide, 19).  The same 
verb “aimer” is used for both uses).  Candide candidly accepts her words as truth, but, once they arrive at the house 
of the Buenos Aries governor, the meaning of Cunegonde’s love is not so certain.  The police arrive in hot pursuit of 
the priest’s murderer and something peculiar happens concerning “love.”  The old woman advises Cunegonde by 
saying, “You cannot escape [with Candide] and you have no fear.  You are not the one who killed [a priest and a 
Jew], and, besides, the governor, who is in love with you, won’t let you be mistreated.  Sit tight” (Candide, 26).  
Although he uses the same words as Cunegonde and the old woman, obviously Candide’s emotions, and his love, 
are strikingly different.  And so, as the events of the story unfold, the meaning of “love” decays.  Candide means one 
thing; Cunegonde another.  
Candide is devastated when he has to abandon Cunegonde.  The text reads: “Candide wept: O my beloved 
Cunegonde!  Must I leave you now, just when the governor is about to marry us!  Cunegonde brought from so far, 
what will ever become of you?” (Candide, 27).  Of course the governor had no intention of marrying Candide and 
Cunegonde, but the ever-sincere Candide only takes people, and their words, at face value.  He is unable to see 
“below the surface” or compare words with actions and arrive at more balanced conclusions.  “Love” is used to 
reveal Candide’s isolation and ignorance of the many possible uses of words.  Candide is unaware of the true 
complexity of interpersonal communication. Rigorous definitions would solve this linguistic problem, but here, in 
practice, the problem does not stop at the linguistic level. 
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does not mean two people act upon the same impulse. Only hesitation and an emotional 
distancing would help him understand how his use of “love” is different than someone else’s. 
Then he could “agree together” with another person about the use of the words. 
The problem with “love” reveals another problem: Candide does not know himself; he 
does not understand how to relate his desire to the world.  For example, after Candide kills the 
Jew and the priest, Cunegonde panics because her financial security is lost.  She accosts Candide 
by saying: “How is it that you, who were born so gentle, could kill in two minutes a Jew and a 
prelate?”  Candide defends himself by saying that he is not acting sincerely, that he is not feeling 
like himself.  He says, “Why dear girl, […] when a man is in love, jealous, and just whipped by 
the Inquisition, he is no longer himself.”194  Confusion over what words themselves mean is one 
problem, but confusion over what one’s will is is another much more complex problem. 
Candide’s inner life becomes as muddled as his external life; he is plagued with subjective 
babble.  The noise of the world infects him with confusion. The assortment of possible “formal 
causes” through which he might attain his happiness is daunting and it leaves him confused 
about his own intentions.  
Candide appears to be as confused as Cunegonde about how he is able to kill.  He 
“means” to act one way, but acts another.  He knows what he wants, but he does not know which 
action will get what he wants.  This “self-confusion” is increased later when Candide kills for a 
third time.  He says: “Alas dear God! […] I am the best man in the world, and here are three men 
I’ve killed already, and two of the three were priests.”195  Candide sincerely does not understand 
himself just as he sincerely does not understand how to interpret the world.196  And the two kinds 
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of knowledge go hand-in-hand: How we use words and what we intend by them correlates with 
our desires.  Candide may know he wants Cunegonde, but he does not know how best to get 
what he wants and unfortunately his belief in Optimism in contingent upon his success.  That is, 
his belief in Optimism is contingent upon his acting correctly so as to obtain happiness.  His 
knee-jerk reactions put him further from his goal and muddy his psychological waters.  His 
tendency to be gentle is corrupted as he strives harder and harder to make sure that this is the 
best of all possible worlds, i.e., attain his lover.  As he experiences more, he begins to hesitate 
more and more.197 
Just like his untested use of words like “dearly love,” his spontaneous beliefs about 
himself and his world are a constant cause of deep problems. These spontaneous beliefs are then 
catalysts for dramatic salvation experiences. He reacts to the surface of this world, to the first 
possible interpretation, and these interpretations are consistently mistaken. His mistakes are both 
                                                                                                                                                             
Scherr argues opposite Wolper saying that it is a sign of Candide’s wisdom that he finally abandons his 
“compassion” and instead isolates himself and develops his garden. 
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Candide’s confusion about what he wants and how to get it dramatically reveals itself.  To summarize: Candide flees 
for his life to another South America country and leaves Cunegonde behind.  There he meets a fellow German: 
Cunegonde’s brother the Baron!  Before they recognize each other, the German says: “God be praised [. . .] since he 
is German, I can talk to him” (Candide, 28).  After they recognize each other, Candide says: “What a miracle!” 
(Candide, 28).  They talk; they eat.  When Candide confesses his hope to marry the Baron’s sister, the Baron’s warm 
tones abruptly end.  The Baron says: “You insolent dog!” (Candide, 30).  Candide then quickly kills the Baron.  
Immediately (as quoted in the above paragraph) Candide cries out: “Alas, dear God!” and laments his third killing 
(Candide, 30).  Candide and his servant Cocambo flee.  They eat salted ham and Candide cries salted tears.  He 
laments that he will never regain Cunegonde after killing her brother.  As they talk and eat, they hear a noise in the 
jungle.  Two women are being chased by two monkeys.  Candide quickly shoots the two monkeys and rejoices 
saying, “God be praised! [. . .] I’ve saved those two poor creatures from great danger” (Candide, 31.  A wonderfully 
sarcastic line!  Are the monkeys or the women more dangerous?)  Candide is quickly silenced when he sees the 
women turn and weep over the bodies of the slain monkeys. He murdered the women’s lovers!  Candide sincerely 
laments and expresses his confusion.  Later that night, the women complain to the natives who then capture Candide 
and his servant.  The natives prepare to eat Candide and his servant; Candide sincerely laments more.  Just before 
they die, Cocambo proves to the natives that they are actually friends—yesterday he and Candide killed a Jesuit 
priest (the Baron).  The natives rejoice and release Candide and Cocambo.  This turn of events launches Candide 
into sincere praise and adoration for the Americans.  He says: “What a people [. . .] What men!  What customs!  If I 
had not had the good luck to run a sword through the body of Miss Cunegonde’s brother, I would have been eaten 
on the spot” (Candide, 33). 
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outwardly directed actions and feelings of compassion or love. He consistently acts and feels 
incorrectly; he fails.  
Sincerity and spontaneous feelings are a serious problem for Candide.  The oscillation is 
made more apparent with his exclamations, his “alas” and his “God be praised.” Each is a 
certain, committed interpretation of the events.  Although each is sincere, total, and committed, 
some later event keeps changing the interpretation of the previous event.  Every interpretation he 
offers is an extreme position that quickly becomes an error of judgment.  He is too quick; he is 
too candid.  He is a mirror who reflects the most immediate, superficial interpretation possible 
and so he oscillates from praise to despair at every turn of the story.  
 
A Stabilizing Meal  
The answer to failure is not rigor or a stronger impulse. The answer is stabilization, 
limitation and control. The answer is technical. Candide’s tool for accomplishing these 
necessities is a meal.  Candide’s “stability” is a disconnection from sincerity and immediate 
interpretation of a situation. He tries to limit every impulse and balance himself.  He hesitates. 
To do this he establishes a context by which he can stabilize, limit and control sense data. Meals 
help him make better judgments.  
Before he begins to hesitate, Candide’s oscillation between praise and despair continues 
and becomes more and more extreme.198  As his moments of depression become darker and 
darker, Candide seeks a miserable travel partner.  Candide advertises his desire for a travel 
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 In Eldorado, Candide thinks, “All is for the best.”  He now has money to rescue and provide for 
Cunegonde.  As they travel to fetch her, more and more money is lost until Candide laments that the only solid 
things in life are virtue and the joy of seeing Cunegonde again (Candide, 41).  Yet, Candide is still Optimistic until 
he is robbed of almost everything and meets a slave whose body has been mutilated.  Candide says: “Optimism is a 
mania for saying ‘well’ when we’re in hell”  (Candide, 41).  After this he sheds bitter tears which clearly mark a 
move away from Pangloss’s Optimism in to deep despair. 
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partner and holds a contest at an inn.  Candide has dinner with twenty miserable souls to 
determine who is most miserable: 
Candide wanted to choose among the leading candidates, so he picked out about twenty 
who seemed companionable enough, and of whom each pretended to be more miserable 
than all the others.  He brought them together at his inn and gave them a dinner, on 
condition that each swear to tell truthfully his entire history.  He would select as his 
companion the most truly miserable and rightly discontented man, and among the others 
he would distribute various gifts. […]  At last he decided in favor of a poor scholar […] 
who was in fact a good man, had been robbed by his wife, beaten by his son, and deserted 
by his daughter, who had got herself abducted by a Portuguese.199 
Martin, the pessimistic scholar, wins the contest.  And two things happen indirectly: First, 
Candide has a meal to help him choose between the stories.  He establishes a context to order, 
control and focus his interpretation of multiple stimuli.  The meal establishes a situation that 
helps to stabilize each story in relation to all the others.  Second, the semantic problems do not 
go away. The meal helps Candide listen and distinguish between good and bad acting but 
Candide cannot really know, with absolute certainty, that the stories he is hearing are true.  
Although they swear, there is a measure of faith involved.  And when they get right down to it, 
Candide is just picking the best actor.  But the meal helps Candide navigate this ambiguity.  The 
“injustice” the nineteen losers feel confirms the problems.  They all exert an effort to portray 
themselves as the most “truly miserable” person present. After Martin wins, the others want 
compensation for their effort.200  
As Candide and Martin travel together, they talk of their troubles.  But the Demonstrator 
makes an important distinction between the two men: 
However, Candide had one great advantage over Martin, […] he still hoped to see Miss 
Cunegonde again, and Martin had nothing to hope for; besides, [Candide] had gold and 
diamonds, and though he had lost a hundred big red sheep loaded with the greatest 
treasures of the earth, though he had always at his heart a memory of the Dutch 
merchant’s villainy, yet, when he thought of the wealth that remained in his hands, and 
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when he talked of Cunegonde, especially just after a good dinner, he still inclined to the 
system of Pangloss.201 
Here we see Candide swing back to Pangloss’ view, and this just four pages after one of his 
lowest points.  The objectivity of Leibniz’s view (the rightness or wrongness of Optimism) 
changes depending on Candide’s subjective perspective.  Interestingly, it is not argumentation 
but physical pleasure that fills Candide with hope and an agreement for Pangloss’ system. The 
meal itself is the anchor that grounds Candide’s hope and helps him understand the objective 
truth about his world.202 
When Candide is full of food, he has hope and believes Leibniz; when he is empty, he 
despairs. Like the oscillating interpretations of the events of his life, the language and concepts 
Candide and Martin share are transitory and provisional.  Their beliefs are provisional; their 
acceptance or denial of propositions is provisional.  There is nothing transcendent about “hope” 
or “love” in the story.  The subjectivity of their experiences affects their commitment and 
experience of “hope” and “love.”  They “work out” faith in Optimism or “work out” doubt in 
such concepts.203 This is the explanation mode in reverse. 
Coherence is built out of contracts.  Love, hope and faith in Optimism are reaffirmed 
each day as the characters relate their lives to the concepts.  They all live within a system and 
each part of the system influences the other parts.  Use of language and human desire itself, in 
Candide, become coherent only in relation to other words or other desires.  As a result, their 
philosophic commitments and their love are intricately related to and influenced by their bodies.  
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 This passage brings up an important instance of oscillation: the word “hope.”  At times this word is used 
sarcastically; at other times, the word is used with complete sincerity.  Like “love” the word “hope” changes 
depending upon the speaker and the situation.  Going into detail here really does not help me unpack my argument 
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concept—grows full or empty in accordance with the circumstances.  In Candide, the stomach’s fullness or 
emptiness coincides with the fullness or emptiness of a concept. 
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 Martin captures this transitory, existential reaffirmation of belief when he says, after something horrible 
happens, “I am more a Manache than ever.”  Belief is not a secure place; they are continually fitting their intellectual 
commitments to life.  
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The truthfulness of Optimism or the reality of love is built out of faithful commitments to the 
unseen reality of these ideas.  Optimism and love are built, not agreed to and then implemented.  
Work is first, then the product of work grows into existence: Optimism, belief in God or love. 
 
Another Meal 
The reverse-mode of explanation and hesitation reveal themselves more fully with 
Paquette.204  Paquette is one of the “returns” that gives Candide hope of attaining his ultimate 
goal, Cunegonde.  When Candide and Martin meet Paquette, they make a wager concerning her 
happiness.  To Candide, she and the man she travels with —Brother Giroflee—appear happy.  
Martin, being a miserable wretch, disagrees.  To test Paquette and her male companion, Candide 
says, “I’ll invite them to dinner.”205  And so Candide repeats his process by which he became 
friends with Martin.  A meal becomes the tool that Candide uses to match the first appearances 
of a situation with reality he uses the meal to build a linguistic and conceptual relationship.  By 
sharing a meal, they establish a context by which to understand one another better.  He uses 
meals to get past the “sincerity” problem, to stabilize language and to decipher motivations. 
 During the meal, Paquette “pours forth her heart.”206  She says, “I was perfectly innocent 
when you knew me” (at which time, remember, she gave Pangloss syphilis) and, “My innocence 
would never have saved me if I had not been rather pretty.”207  Her words obviously slip into 
ambiguity until she says that she is “obliged to continue this abominable trade [of prostitution] 
which you men find so pleasant and which for us is nothing but a bottomless pit of misery.”208  
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Even though her worlds are not consistent, her life, in relation to her words, reveals the truth of 
her story.  As Martin comments later: “To really know someone, you have to see them at 
home.”209  Candide uses a meal to help establish a context to communicate the truth about her 
life. 
 So Martin wins the bet.  Candide is convinced that Paquette is not happy.  And so, with 
Paquette, Candide appears to be learning.  He is not oblivious of the act of the meal as he was 
with the Bulgars.  He is using the meal to come to agreement about language, actions and 
concepts.  The meal stabilizes and fills him up and puts him in the best possible frame of mind.  
By using meals, he limits the violence of his own desire and escapes the problems that plague his 
earlier attempts at pity.  
 
Candide’s Problem 
Candide’s non-violent solution is money.  Upon Paquette he dumps a huge amount of 
money and believes that this will solve her problems.  If she can use this money to buy food, she 
will be happy—full of Optimism.  She will be able to lead a good life and be in peace.  He 
repeats this solution on the six dethroned king, believing that the answer to human unhappiness 
is an influx of money—money that will let a person “get what they want.”   
This non-violent solution seems to do the trick until we meet Paquette again.  When we 
meet Paquette again, she is even unhappier than before Candide’s generous gift.  The text reads: 
One thing served to confirm Martin in his detestable opinions, to make Candide hesitate 
more than ever, and to embarrass Pangloss.  It was the arrival one day at their farm of 
Paquette and Brother Giroflee, who were in the last stages of misery.  They had quickly 
run through their three thousand piastries, had split up, made up, quarreled, been jailed, 
escaped, and finally Brother Giroflee has turned Turk.  Paquette continued to ply her 
trade [prostitution] everywhere, and no longer made any money at it.210 
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Candide’s non-violent expression of pity fails.  Although he read her situation correctly, he was 
unable personally to fix Paquette’s unhappiness.  In fact, Paquette is worse off than before. 
Money does not answer her needs.211  Candide “hesitates” because although he was no violent 
this time, he still fails.  
Candide’s private desire to help Paquette remains only “subjective babble”212 until he 
acts out and gives her money.  His gift is not enough to make her happy.  Money does not let 
Candide communicate his meaning (i.e. make Paquette become fulfilled).  As a result, Candide 
hesitates because it is money that he hoped would get him Cunegonde. His best option—a non-
violent, financial investment—does not fix his world.  Fulfillment proves to be a very 
complicated thing, especially in a world where each person seeks her own notion of fulfillment 
through whatever formal causes are available.  
Candide fails because, in the reverse mode of explanation, Paquette herself must “work 
out” her own happiness.  He cannot “give” her the answer.  She cannot buy it or receive it from 
another person. In Candide self-fulfillment is reciprocal.  While society does cause frustration 
and does reveal anti-agency, it is only through society that fulfillment develops.  Money is not 
enough to bring fulfillment although it certainly helps.  
The idea is that fulfillment, in Candide, comes indirectly or from an assortment of goods.  
To truly help Paquette, Candide must help her help herself.  Candide must help her cultivate her 
happiness, but what happiness is and how to cultivate it are not things Candide knows.  He does 
not know what sufficient reasons will make his life “best.” The health of the community will 
reveal how cultivation is working. The habit of cultivation will be adjusted to maximize the 
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 Dr. Cope explains that, as Locke understood language, private thoughts do not make any sense until they 
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community’s effort to “thrive.” In Candide’s case specifically, the performance of cultivation is 
an exploration of what formal causes will develop into his happiness. In Candide, only after 
feeding the body can the mind commit to a concept.  Only after weeding a garden will the earth 
produce abundant food.  In the reverse mode—the world of systematicity, we do not begin with 
certainty and then believe; we believe and then are certain.  We cultivate certainty; we leap 
faithfully into the stability of Leibniz.  
 
Conclusion 
Candide advances a metaphor—a performance—without giving a motive for this 
performance. As we explain this performance, we reveal our own testimonies; as we tell why we 
would or would not cultivate, we reveal our own perceived goods. Candide shows us the system 
we live in and read from.  In this way, analyzing Candide results in a proliferation of readings 
because metaphors need interpretation.  As has been said before, Voltaire takes as his satiric 
object human nature itself.  The true lesson of the tale is that we see our interpretations as acts of 
will and, therefore, as appetitive. In Candide, Voltaire is not being pessimistic about language, 
love or metaphysics.  He is showing how humans use language and concepts as part of their 
physical existence.  As the treatment of “love” reveals, semantics are consensual, too.213  
Language is a way of “explaining the world” to other people.214  It is only through consent, 
through mutual agreement, that language works.  
Like language, Candide’s desire for Cunegonde is “subjective babble” until it exists in 
the world.215  Desire does not “make sense” by itself; only within a group can desire become 
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knowledge. The contract regulates violent acts such as the individual’s misreading or 
misapplying of desire in some way.216 As Candide and company work to feed themselves, they 
establish the condition for living in the best of possible worlds.  As they work and make their 
lives better, their beliefs about the goodness of the world necessarily follow from these habits.217 
A faithful habit of cultivation eventually produces a garden. Work is the technical and day-to-
day expression of “Love.” It moves toward an end, but it does not pay much attention to what 
particular end it will reach. That this is the lesson of the tale can be seen in the treatment of 
Pangloss: Despite all the bodily violence and mutilation, one thing never happens to him: His 
tongue is never cut out. 218 All Pangloss is asked to do is “bridle” his tongue. This “bridling” is 
not a silencing of judgment, but for judgment to serve responsibly, to arise out of the work of a 
community and to admit its own appetitive nature. Pangloss is quick to see the end of all their 
                                                                                                                                                             
transformation; first it moves from a collection of discrete experiences to a general terminology, from this or that 
ball or this or that broom to “ball” and “broom” as a category identifier; then, more wonderously [sic] still, language 
passes from the private dialogue inside the individual head to a social medium of information exchange, from 
millions of idiosyncratic, internal languages to a conventional code that everyone understands.  These 
transformations are fundamental and essential rather than quantitative or qualitative; internal babble turns into 
coherent code, then coherent code metamorphoses from a personal denotative system into a medium of 
communication” (102). 
216
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money regulates violence.  The problem with money is that, while it is a product of some contracts, it does not help 
unify moral and linguistic differences.  Meals, on the other hand, unify humans in all these ways.  Cope writes: 
“Dominion, even God’s, cannot exist until someone invents the artificial idea of ‘property.’  Everything know is 
known through ideas; as products, ideas are artificial; things artificial lead to artificing powers; and artificing 
powers, for the ever-ethical Locke, have no meaning outside of the production of artifacts” (Analogies, 109). 
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 It is important to notice that “the garden” is not a physical place at all.  Gardens are the result of a habit 
of work, not a place. 
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 No one in the tale has a body that is as distorted as Pangloss’.  There could be various reasons for this, 
but one of them is that Voltaire wants to show how Pangloss is disconnected from his own body.  Just as he ignores 
Jacques’ plight or that of the citizens of Lisbon and instead proves how justified the death and destruction are, so too 
he ignores his own body. Voltaire doles out a healthy portion of violence in response to this blindness. As we 
progress, we will see why such blindness to the body problematizes human life and the system of the world. It is the 
body that allows the “reverse mode of explanation” to work. 
A. O. Lovejoy, “The Principle of Plentitude,” Candide: The Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton 
and Company Press, 1966), 121. Lovejoy points out that, “The philosophers of optimism were […] desirous of 
proving was that reality is rational through and through, that every fact of existence, however unpleasant, is 
grounded in some reason as clear and evident as an axiom of mathematics.” Candide hesitates to come to a 
conclusion because he does not yet see the reationality for his life. He waits for further developments.  
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efforts, but Candide interrupts him in the final line of the tale to draw his attention to the body, to 
work and to the habits of cultivation that will make his buoyant beliefs mean anything.  
Candide, like all novels, explores an epistemological dilemma. Unlike other novels, 
Candide asserts a metaphor that the reader must explain. In the explanation, the reader’s 
testimony inevitably reveals itself. As the reader compares this testimony to other critics, the 
integrity of the testimony is tested and, eventually, a consensus can be reached. Locke was 
interested in differing opinions and how these opinions led to consensus.  Affirming Locke’s 
values, Voltaire’s satire encourages diverse opinions.  Voltaire, like Locke, does not judge 
between the truthfulness of the individual opinions. The proliferation of opinions was the first 
step in the consenting process. To build consent, we must start by identifying testimonies. 
Candide’s central metaphor draws out the reader’s testimony and so begins the consenting 
process. By asserting a mysterious metaphor, Voltaire echoes Locke’s own interest in “integrity” 
instead of “proof.” Both Locke and Voltaire teach the reader about the process of consent. This 
process finds practical expression in meals. As the text reveals, eating meals becomes the context 
that allows a human to analyze immediate impulses. Meals help us see how volition relates to 
judgment. As we read Candide, we must participate in this lesson by revealing our own appetites 
as we interpret Candide’s motivation for cultivating his garden.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Hedonists are just Puritans in rebellion. 
-Terry Eagleton 
 
A Loss of Being 
Introduction 
 The presence of meals in Candide argues against the claim that Candide’s hesitation 
proves his “dehumanization,” “desexualization,” or his “absurdity.” The presence of meals also 
challenges the claim that money and a free market become the new principles of community life. 
I argue that meals are tools that balance various aspects of one’s life and so cultivate a mutually 
fulfilling community. Specifically, cultivating meals is the performance of Love. 
 
Voltaire Versus Rousseau 
 Rousseau influences contemporary understandings of desire.219 This can be seen in 
particular critics of Voltaire’s Candide.  The problem—if there is one—results from different 
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 Robert Wokler, “Ancient Postmodernism in the Philosophy of Rousseau,” The Cambridge Companion 
to Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 418-443. Wokler writes that, after their deaths, 
Voltaire and Rousseau are lumped together “as if these two fiercest ideological emnemies of the whole eighteenth 
century were some homogeneous Gilbertonsullivan compound” (421).  Wokler’s analysis is to show that modern 
thought and society is much indebted to Rousseau.  For example, Wokler writes, “Across what would now be 
termed different disciplines, Rousseau managed to probe and uncover some of modernity’s deepest faults, and to my 
mind, the flawed world that he portrayed throughout his writings was not only his but also ours” (438).  He writes: 
“Although they are unfortunately seldom noticed, there are many features of Rousseau’s philosophy that address the 
empty formalism and abstract foundationalism of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century metaphysics in terms later 
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protagonists who, to use Hegelian language, was the an sich aber nicht fur sich, that is, who was part of it but in 
large measure did not subscribe to it” (420).  Also, concerning language, Wokler writes, “[Rousseau’s] 
understanding of the trappings of civilization is, to my mind, even richer than Foucault’s, not least because in 
Heideggaerian fashion, he understood the force of language and metaphor and the ways in which, through language, 
individuals became the victims not just of one another’s abuse of power but also of their own ideals, subjugated by 
their own conjugations, as it were, running headlong into their chains, thinking themselves free” (421).   Concerning 
government: “Rousseau set out to explain that our political institutions were themselves responsible for the crimes 
they were purported to solve, providing solutions to problems of which those solutions were in fact the cause” (423).  
Maybe most importantly for this paper is Rousseau’s concept of la liberte morale which had as its most distinctive 
feature a “peculiarly reflexive element of self-prescription.  Every morally free agent, Rousseau insisted, was 
required to follow rules established only within the depths of his own conscience in a self-reliant manner, free from 
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understandings of “technique” and how technique relates to human desire. Expressions of 
Rousseau’s understanding of human desire keep popping up in contemporary culture. It is no 
surprise that one finds critics of Voltaire analyzing the text in light of the categories of desire 
which Rousseau himself defined. According to Rousseau, a loss of desire coincides with a loss of 
being.  Because Rousseau and Voltaire were fierce ideological rivals it is important to 
understand how Voltaire might have viewed desire differently. The difference can be seen in 
how he treats spontaneity and immediate impulses. Building off of the last chapter, we will see 
that a technical habit of cultivation produces a spontaneous enjoyment of food. 
 For Rousseau, society kills spontaneity and with it freedom, pleasure and joy.  In 
contrast, for Voltaire and Locke, spontaneous desires are never coherent by themselves.  Every 
word, every desire must be disciplined, limited, controlled and brought into relation to other 
people’s desires.  Coherency is itself a product of a contract.  Only in a contract do desires make 
sense. Human reason and spontaneous pleasure are both products of such contracts. 
 As already presented, there exists a proliferation of readings on Candide.  This 
proliferation of readings rises out of the tendency of the text to interrupt itself and advance an 
unexplained metaphor.  Another reason for a proliferation of readings is the different 
understandings of what a “human” actually is.  Candide satirizes human nature; what this nature 
is and how we understand it will change the nature of the satire because as we explain the 
metaphor, our eisegetical readings reveal what we believe about “humanity.”  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the influences of all other persons” (425).  “Because of ideals like those listed above,” Wokler writes, “I should like, 
however, to conclude these reflections on Rousseau’s ancient postmodernism by addressing not his role in the 
French Revolution that failed to occur but rather the significance of his classical republican ideals with respect to the 
Revolution that did take place, whose greatest success and failures alike were to earn from his the status of chief 
poet and acknowledged legislator of the age of modernity we still inhabit” (430). 
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Two Scholars Apply Rousseau to Candide 
For example, to have an ordered and fruitful society, the garden party must abandon 
sexuality at the gate: Arthur Scherr, in “Candide’s Garden Revisited: Gender Equality in a 
Commoner’s Paradise,” argues that gender equality in Candide’s garden results from the switch 
from a medieval economic system (which prized rank over skill) to a free market economy.220  
The garden party exchanges spontaneous excitement and discovery for a “grim determination” to 
cultivate the garden.221  Money brings about the freedom necessary for a healthy, gender-equal 
society; money becomes the new norm, which will allow productive skillful work to occur.  
Scherr champions the economic switch he sees being made at the end of Candide.  The ending of 
Candide marks, in Scherr’s view, the “desexualization” of the characters as money, rather than 
sexuality or rank, becomes the organizing factor of the economy.  Money becomes the impetus 
for a “gender equal” garden and the new norm for the modern world.222 The garden marks a loss 
of being and pleasure. 
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ideal actually is, we do not know. 
222
 Because of this argument Scherr makes, an easy connection can be made between his analysis and Terry 
Eagleton’s analysis of contemporary capitalism. 
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Like many postmodern and cultural theorists, Scherr reveals a postmodern preoccupation 
with sex223 and, with this preoccupation, a belief that desire and society are diametrically 
opposed.  In this view of sex, we find housed an element of Rousseau’s thought.  Scherr sees 
only two moments of “spontaneous pleasure” (i.e., sex) in Candide.224  He writes that the 
characters abandon these marvelous moments of pleasure in order to start grimly working.  For 
Scherr, work and pleasure are cut off from one another.  Duty and fulfillment are irreconcilable.  
The characters abandon the possibility of becoming fulfilled and instead take up a disciplined 
and rigorous responsibility.   The mechanism of “working hard” excludes the orgasm of pleasure. 
Because the height of pleasure is sex, the characters must abandon their sexuality in order to 
enter the financial stability of the garden. Pleasure and political success are incompatible. 
According to Scherr’s reading of Candide, society and the marketplace come into essential 
conflict with the nature of human desire. For one to succeed, the other must end. To be pleased 
sexually and spontaneously is to live a life outside of society.  To live in the garden requires a 
loss of being. 
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 I am not being a puritan, but am trying to point out, as Eagleton does, that “hedonists are just Puritans in 
rebellion” (After Theory, 5). Eagleton responds to contemporary Literary Theory by saying that studies on sex help 
“put paid” to the powerful myth that “pleasure falls outside the realm of knowledge, and thus is dangerously 
anarchic.”  These studies have helped to demolish the puritan dogma that seriousness is one thing and pleasure 
another.”  Eagleton continues his analysis of Theory’s sex studies and says that hedonists are puritans in rebellion: 
“Both of them equate truth with earnestness.  Old-style puritanical capitalism forbade us to enjoy ourselves, since 
once we had acquired a taste or the stuff we would probably never see the inside of the workplace again” (5). An 
analysis of pleasure need not be merely an analysis of sex. For example, Scherr writes, “Which are the conte’s most 
joyous moments?  These seem to be Candide’s first sensual encounters with Cunegonde behind the screen, and the 
incident in chapter 16 when the Oreillon girls cavort with their simian “amants” shortly before Candide kills them.  
The two episodes have in common the participants’ unabashed, instinctive behavior and childlike passionate 
intensity, traits that are depressingly absent from Candide generally, with its pervasive tone of cynicism and clever 
mockery, its endless catalogue of catastrophe” (53).   
Moishe Black also connects happiness to sex.  Sex is actually “the short road to happiness” (180). 
224
 Scherr mentions the “monkey scene” and the scene, at the beginning, when Cunegonde catches Candide 
behind the curtain and kisses him (52).  But he ignores the constant spontaneous enjoyment of food.  For example, 
just before Candide kills the monkeys, he blubbers about Cunegonde while stuffing his face in an apparently 
completely spontaneous way.  He cannot help himself; he enjoys food regardless of his emotional state. 
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Scherr fits in with those cultural theorists225 who defer metaphysical questions and limit 
themselves to justifying “what works” or “what practical reason we have for doing what we do” 
rather than seeking a better way of doing things.  Today, there is no pressing need to legitimize 
one’s lifestyle.  Rather, it is enough to justify what one does.226  Scherr says as much when he 
limits himself to sufficient causes (sociology) and leaves the “metaphysical issues” to other 
scholars. Like a good modern scholar, Scherr and many other scholars are eager to point out that 
Voltaire focuses on particulars—or nips metaphysical speculation in the bud—and so “frees” us 
from this nagging call to explain everything.  The idea is that once “free” we can live as best we 
can. 
But, Voltaire is ultimately saying something else about desire. Voltaire is not being 
relativistic but is seeking the integrity of metaphysical connections. We can know this because of 
the proliferations of readings the tale produces. For example, to explain more fully how Candide 
encourages a proliferation of readings, a contrast between Scherr and Wolper is helpful.  In an 
opposite way from what Sherr argues, Wolper laments that the very move Scherr praises—the 
move to work grimly in the garden—is the expression of Candide’s foolishness.  Wolper argues 
that when Candide and company selfishly think only of themselves and of their small community 
instead of the “other” and “the world,” they represent a subtle vice rather than the often-
celebrated virtuous work ethic.  Virtue—true virtue—Wolper writes is considerate “of other, not 
self; the world, not the little group only.”227  Wolper argues that, although Candide “has taken in 
friends, he has not advanced in his generosity.  In fact, Wolper moans, Candide was initially 
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 “Cultural Theory” is post-deconstruction and includes thinkers like Rorty and Fish.  Cultural Theorists 
and “Anti-Theorists” (as Eagleton calls Rorty and Fish particularly) are lumped together in what Eagleton calls 
“postmodern thinkers.”   
226
 Eagleton summarizes these ideas and points out Stanly Fish and Richard Rorty as being examples of the 
contemporary “anti-theory” as Eagleton calls it (After Theory, 54). 
227
 Wolper, 276. 
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more generous: He helped strangers, not just associates.  For example, “he gave his last florins to 
the beggar-Pangloss, and he pitched in and helped the survivor of the earthquake.”228   
Wolper forgets to mention all the other ways Candide’s “generosity” damages his world; 
Wolper does not see that Candide’s desires and his compassion are themselves anti-agents in his 
world.  By prizing “selflessness” as Wolper does, Wolper reveals his own misunderstanding of 
virtue.229  Wolper associates strong feelings with virtuous actions and seems to care more about 
“feelings of generosity” than the result of these feelings.  Wolper laments that the characters are 
reduced to “functions” (i.e., not feeling).230  And he says that a loss of feeling coincides with a 
loss of being.231  The mechanistic quality of the garden kills the feelings that give humans moral 
value.  Wolper writes that Candide is a dunce because he closes his eyes to the suffering of his 
neighbors, and “vainly believes that appetitive evil can be fenced out, to blindly miss the grim 
implications of stupidity, to leave unfulfilled the growth of human potential.”232  For Wolper, the 
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 C. S. Lewis has some thoughts about virtue and “duty.” This goal-oriented fulfillment, as already 
mentioned, comes by way of Kant. Eagleton was not the first person to make this connection: C. S. Lewis said as 
much when he wrote the The Weight of Glory. Lewis approaches the problem from another angle: He is concerned 
with people who build a sense of virtue off of “denying themselves,” rather than a positive and “fulfilling” principle.  
He is speaking to a mass audience in a then predominantly Christian culture.  Perhaps the Cultural Theory Eagleton 
is responding to is a correction of the Stoicism to which Lewis is addressing himself.  Lewis wrote: “If you asked 
twenty good men today what they thought the highest of the virtues, nineteen of them would reply, Unselfishness.  
But if you had asked almost any of the great Christians of old, he would have replied, Love.  You see what has 
happened?  A negative term has been substituted for a positive, and this is of more than philological importance.  
The negative idea of Unselfishness carries with it the suggestion not primarily of securing good things for others, but 
of going without them ourselves, as if our abstinence and not their happiness was the important point.  I do not think 
this is the Christian virtue of Love.  The New Testament has lots to say about self-denial, but not about self-denial as 
an end in itself.  We are told to deny ourselves and to take up our crosses in order that we may follow Christ; and 
nearly every description of what we shall ultimately find if we do so contains an appeal to desire.  If there lurks in 
most modern minds the notion that to desire our own good and earnestly to hope for the enjoyment of it is a bad 
thing.  I submit that this notion has crept in from Kant that the Stoics and is no part of the Christian faith.  Indeed, if 
we consider the unblushing promises of promises and the staggering nature of the rewards promised in the Gospel, it 
would seem that Out Lord finds out desires not too strong, but too weak.  We are half-hearted creatures, fooling 
about with drink and sex and ambition when infinite joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to get on 
making mud pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at the sea.  We are far 
too easily pleased.” 
In addition to Lewis, Eagleton explains that Kant divorced fulfillment from duty (After Theory, 124). 
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 Wolper, 275. 
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“reduction” of Candide’s life is itself an evil.  The mere existence inside a garden represents his 
foolishness.  What Candide needs, Wolper argues, is to “be generous.”233   
Although they each respond to Candide in radically different ways, Scherr and Wolper 
agree in their understandings of desire.  One wants technicality without feeling while the other 
wants feeling without technicality.  Neither scholar can connect technique to desire (or see how 
desire serves science). Sherr praises the new value of grimly determining to work; Wolper 
laments the loss of spontaneous feelings of compassion and the limitations, the “smallness,” of 
the garden.  In both scholars, although their readings are very different, there exists a dominant 
element of Rousseauian thought: Pleasure is spontaneous and therefore strongest when sexual; 
because pleasure is spontaneous, technicality is anathema.  Both scholars read the tale in terms of 
this category of pleasure. For them, the rigors of duty destroy the possibility of fulfillment.  
 
Technically Produced, Spontaneous Pleasure 
Neither scholar considers that it is possible to cultivate “exuberant, exploratory eating” or 
generosity that actually helps make life better for everyone.  But this is exactly what happens in 
the tale.  Work provides the “spontaneous pleasure” of enjoying food.  In this story, food and 
pleasure are technical affairs—not orgasmic spontaneous impulses, but pleasant nonetheless.  As 
technical affairs, it is possible that admittance into the garden requires not a de-sexualization but 
a re-sexualization, not de-humanization but a re-humanization.  
The discussion between failure of desire and fulfillment lands us in an analysis of what is 
“human nature.”234  Candide can be read as presenting a much different sort of “human nature” 
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 Wolper writes, “Early on Candide is better” morally. That is, he was more generous (276). 
234
 To discuss postmodern desire and respond to contemporary scholarship requires a new definition of 
human nature. Terry Eagleton discusses such definitions in his book. Eagleton asks questions of both Literary 
Studies and Philosophy.  These questions would hopefully start a shift in discussions past Cultural Theory, which 
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than the one Wopler and Scherr build their arguments upon.  Of course, what “human nature” 
means is a cause for immediate debate. One view is “prescriptive,” the other “descriptive.”235  
One view of “human nature” sees the world as tragically maiming the human.  In response to this 
                                                                                                                                                             
has dominated English and Philosophy studies since the nineteen-sixties.  To have this discussion, Eagleton had to 
address the “metaphysical apathy” of Cultural Theory and it is to this metaphysical apathy that Terry Eagleton 
writes.  Against the relativism that permeates contemporary academics, he argues for objectivity.  But he makes his 
arguments for objectivity through the dominant concept of Cultural Theory: Desire.  He uses the same “anarchical 
force” which carries contemporary postmodernists beyond the confines of science into a blissful and sexually 
pleasing future, but instead of radical freedom, Eagleton argues for “technique.”  
His analysis of desire leads him into a discussion and critique of contemporary understanding of “human 
nature.”  For this reason, he is extremely helpful in responding to contemporary critics who analyze Voltaire.  
Eagleton’s response to postmodern thoughts about desire echoes Voltaire’s treatment of desire in Candide.  This 
desire relates to economic concerns and to the relationship between “pleasure” and “work.”  According to Rousseau, 
to live with people means limiting your desire and thereby causing yourself pain (the ultimate evil for Rousseau).  
Voltaire sees pain and evil as rising out of ignorance.  Knowledge, not isolation, alleviates pain and fits desires with 
the world.  Pleasure rises out of work done with in a community, not out of isolation.  
Scherr is not alone in his appraisal of money as a new norm of the modern world.  Money is perfect for a 
normless society.  In a “normless society” money becomes the only norm (Eagleton, 16). In the capitalist market, 
money becomes the new standard.  But while money is a great way to move beyond rank, sexuality and feudal 
systems, money has problems too. Voltaire both submits a promising model in reaction to his culture’s problems, 
but, too, he critiques the model he proposes.  For example, in the text, money drives the Dutchman to mutilate the 
slave and then to take advantage of Candide.  What Candide finds at the end in a way to secure the good money 
brings while minimizing the evils. Scherr ignores the failure of money completely.  
Eagleton explains that money does not allow for human fulfillment because fulfillment is one good among 
many others. Eagleton observes that Kant is in part responsible for this phenomenon in modern culture.  Kant 
divorced “fulfillment” from “duty” (Eagleton, 124). Or fulfillment is arrived at indirectly and is not an “end”; 
fulfillment rises out of multiple goods. Money can buy things but it cannot secure the “multiple goods” needed for 
fulfillment. 
As a standard, money allows for the exploitation of anyone—as long as it is for a good price (Eagleton, 19). 
Money works much like “equality” works in contemporary culture.  Equality is a current watchword for gender 
relations. The idea is that equality will make everyone happy, but this rarely happens.  Equality, like money, is like 
medicine: they can promote health, but only negatively.  Equality and money both protect against tyranny or disease, 
but cannot of themselves promote fulfillment. C. S. Lewis says as much in his That Hideous Strength.  Ransom 
discusses gender relations and equality with the hero of the story saying, “Obedience—humility—is an erotic 
necessity” (490). The idea he expresses is that a mutually satisfying relationship requires positive acts of service—
humble obedience—on the part of both partners. In a parallel fashion, money frees interpersonal relationships from 
the domination of rank or class, but it hardly cultivates the spicy, mutually satisfying interaction between people 
called “love.” Money does not cultivate a habit of humble service. As Paquette reveals, money will not bring 
fulfillment. It can alleviate an uncomfortable state, but it cannot bring about a habit of cultivation.  
Because of money and a consumer culture, pleasure and desire become “ends” to which people strive; 
pleasure becomes a goal rather than an indirect product or thing-that-is-built.  Pleasure is “purchased” not cultivated.  
That is, pleasure is not the product of many different kinds of goods; it is a commodity, or an object to be consumed.  
Paquette is the most obvious example of this problem.  Money affects her like a winning lottery ticket: it is quickly 
spent and she is more miserable than before.  Either her failure to attain desire means that life requires a loss of 
being (Rousseau), or her failure teaches her something about what it means to be human. 
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 Eagleton, 121. 
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tragedy, the more a person desires, the more one can attain.236  Another view sees the restrictions 
that the world places on human life as being instructive.  When these restrictions were flouted, 
the Greeks called this hubris.237 Both views of “human nature” ask the question: What must I do 
to prosper or thrive.  The answer for the first view is stronger desire; the answer for the second 
view is a “technical” answer. 
Both Scherr and Wolper’s criticism exist within the first view of desire: fulfillment is to 
be found in excessive feelings or not at all.  But in the second view of human nature, humans 
have to struggle to become themselves—to be a good human is to reshape your desire to 
correctly fit reality, to desire only what you should desire (versus what you could desire).  Such a 
reshaping is the means to become most fulfilled.238  
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 Eagleton discusses this difference between views of “human nature” and cites Macbeth as an example of 
the issue.  He says, Shakespeare represents “a quarrel between those who see the constraints of human nature as 
creative ones and those for whom being human is a matter of perpetually going beyond them”  (118).  
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 Eagleton also cites this term as he responds to a postmodern understanding of human desire (118). This 
term occurs in a section where Eagleton observes that death is always arbitrary; death is always an unwelcome 
interruption of a good thing—life (116).  If life were a matter of “ends,” this would not be the case.  If life were a 
matter of reaching an end, once a person had fulfilled his or her “end,” death would be welcome. But this is 
obviously not the case. Life is good for its own sake. 
Candide forces knowledge of “death” upon the reader. We are asked to notice “interruptions.” Edwin 
Grobe writes that death is what most obviously proves his thesis because death is the ultimate expression of 
interruption: “The ultimate expression of the discontinuous character of human existence is, of course, the fact of 
death” (334). This, for Grobe, proves that because human life is interrupted, Candide can only “seek continuity 
within himself” (345). 
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 As a historical animal, a human wants to think in “teleological terms” about her life.  For this reason we 
seek specific pleasures or “more money” thinking that through these ends we will be satisfied.  Eagleton believes 
this is a mistake as it covers over the difference between “living for its own sake” and “getting enough pleasure to 
make life worth itself” (Eagleton, 115). Eagleton argues that human life, and human pleasure, are not meant to 
“aim” at a goal at all; rather, human life should be a “delight in and of itself” and “for its own sake.”  Eagleton agues 
this because, he says, happiness is the result of many different goods rather than an “end” of some one thing.  
Happiness rises indirectly out of an assortment of goods. 
Eagleton argues that happiness is about what humans are like, not what they like (Eagleton, 126). For this 
reason, the technique of being a fulfilled human is an objective, not a subjective affair.  Like all techniques 
happiness is an action, a practice, not a “feeling” that imbues a life.  To be fulfilled is to act in certain ways; to 
practice certain habits (Eagleton, 121). 
Joseph Kronick, in “The Ancient Quarrel Revisited: Literary Theory and the Return to Ethics” illumines 
Eagleton’s thoughts. He uses Eagleton’s argument to help himself explain how “aesthetic distance allows us to 
transform the incomprehensibleness of human destruction into a legitimation of human reason, and it does so by 
transforming particularity into the universal” (42). Kronick argues that Eagleton, in After Theory, references the 
power of tragedy to highlight our human need to encounter failure in order to flourish (42). Kronick disagrees with 
Eagleton’s use of tragedy because tragedy destroys the “aesthetic distance” humans need in order to recognize what 
failure means (i.e. to transform particular experiences into universal truths). It is difficult to follow Kronick’s 
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Attaining a perceived good does not necessarily provide humans with happiness. Because 
a formal cause provides the medium by which a human attempts to gain happiness, a myriad of 
options mushroom around a person’s life. Humans can never know for sure what choices will 
bring about happiness. All humans can do is cultivate many different kinds of goods and allow 
happiness to rise indirectly out of the assortment. 
With a different understanding of “human nature,” we can see Candide differently.  How 
we answer the failure of human desire reveals something of ourselves rather than something 
about the text. As a satire, the tale is ambiguous because it is challenging our own meaning-
creating systems; Candide reveals our own prescriptive or descriptive definitions of “human 
nature.”  It is possible to read Candide as teaching the reader to dialogue with others about the 
meaning of the text, to engage in an analysis of all the sundry understandings of “human nature” 
and discover which meaning-giving system has the best answer (even if that answer has 
metaphysical strings attached).  According to Lockean standards of rationality, this best answer 
will be revealed through testimony and consent, not emotions or analytic proof. 
 
Conclusion 
Technique and desire relate to “love.”  If love is merely sexual, then Candide would 
appear to condemn love and all metaphysical connections (as Bonneville argues).  But if desire 
can be shaped to “fit” the world, and thus be made “coherent,” then love has not been destroyed.  
                                                                                                                                                             
thought here, but, apparently, what this means is that Kronick has never laughed at himself—which is precisely what 
Voltaire is encouraging his readers to do for in Candide we see Voltaire’s “grimace.” Joseph De Maiste, in 
“Voltaire’s Greatness,” Candide: The Norton Critical Edition (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), says 
that Voltaire’s “much-vaunted wit is far from unblameable; the laugh it raises is never legitimate; it is a grimace” 
(179). Gustave Flaubert responded similarly to Voltaire: In “Voltaire’s Humanity,” Candide: The Norton Critical 
Edition (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), Flaubert says, “As for novels, Voltaire wrote just one, 
which is a summary of all his works […] His whole intelligence was an implement of war, a weapon. And what 
makes me cherish him is the disgust I fell for his followers, the Voltaireans, those people who laugh at great things. 
Did he laugh, himself? He ground his teeth” (185). In Candide, although we laugh, we retain our distance from 
ourselves.  
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Given a descriptive definition of human nature, love is seen lying closely to objectivity.239 Both 
Wolper and Scherr see Candide moving away from compassion: Scherr sees Candide as grasping 
to reason; Wopler sees Candide as foolishly isolating himself from the wisdom of generous 
feelings.  But, according to Eagleton’s understanding of “human nature,” behavior like 
Candide’s can be seen as an expression of the technique of love—neither coldly “reasonable” nor 
generously emotive.  
For those who argue that Candide has been dehumanized, meals are problematic. Meals 
stiff-arm the quick rush towards metaphysical apathy as well as protect against the melancholic 
laps into selfishness.  Meals capture the moment of hesitation between uncertainty about 
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 “Objectivity,” Eagleton writes, “lies closely to love: a selfless openness to the needs of others”  
(Eagleton, 131). Love is a “radical acceptance” that allows us to see others for what they are (Eagleton, 131). He 
goes on to write, “[It is] only through being the means of your self-fulfillment that I can attain my own and visa 
versa” (Eagleton, 122). Eagleton says that we fulfill ourselves only when we forget about ourselves and help 
someone else become fulfilled.  Eagleton calls this view “politicized love” and sets it in contrast to capitalism’s self-
serving consumerism. Eagleton observes that “self-realization” is too complicated to not argue about, but he wants 
to make a point: In our global culture today, we have become “moral capitalists,” we think only of “ends,” of 
reaching our goal (Eagleton, 123). We do not think of our lives as being for their own sake; we do not try to help 
each other toward a mutual enjoyment of life.  This goal orientation permeates everything in contemporary culture 
(Eagleton, 124). It is no surprise to find it in readings of Candide.  
For a thinker like Aristotle, happiness—although not “orgasmic pleasure”—is still a life that is “thriving or 
flourishing” (Eagleton, 124).  Eagleton connects thriving with serving others because self-fulfillment comes when 
we stop thinking only about ourselves and focus on the context in which we exist.  It is this context we should serve; 
we should make this context thrive.  As such, thriving or “well-being” is one good among others, the result of many 
different kinds of goods.  Virtue is a technique of being human, a habit and not an affair of “the heart” (Eagleton, 
125). 
All actions require a setting in time, and are like “narrative,” Eagleton says.  One cannot just snap and be 
fulfilled or make enough money to arrive at happiness (Eagleton, 128).  Flourishing is a complex issue and because 
it is both public and private—a subjective experience (me) with an objective rubric (technique)—Aristotle did not 
think there was a distinction between ethics and politics (Eagleton, 128). Eagleton goes on to say, “Ethics is in 
Aristotle’s view the science of human desire, since desire is the motive behind all our actions” (129).  Unlike 
Rousseau, a good government would create good citizens; citizens would learn to amend their desires and construct 
a thriving, mutually fulfilling society. Politicized love is a radical attention to a particulars context with an eye for 
better future conditions.  Politicized love is a “form of teleology,” but has a radical attention to a particular place and 
time. Politicized love balances a larger cultural and political context with one’s immediate community.  It is global, 
but only after being radically local. 
In contrast to the liberal view of government which lets each “thrive” apart from the others in his or her 
own gated community or ghetto, this “politicized love” is a government structure that makes “self-realization as far 
as possible reciprocal” (Eagleton, 122). Such an order would require a limited, restricted frame of interaction—
gardens, perhaps—but would also demand that this limited space be based not on a physical space at all.  The 
foundation for a thriving community is not the physical space, but the habit, the technique of service that binds each 
person to the others.  Such a technique would teach the world’s communities how to guard against vice, boredom 
and starvation.  
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metaphysical claims and the rejection of a larger community.  Cultivation of meals is a middle 
way, a habit of work that focuses radically on particulars but works toward developments.  After 
a good meal, one is inclined to make metaphysical claims. 
As seen earlier, Paquette’s goal-oriented desire kept her from happiness.  As she spends 
money to become fulfilled, fulfillment slips away.  Fulfillment is not a commodity to be bought.  
Fulfillment comes only indirectly (or from a bouquet of different good things).  What saves 
Candide and company at the end is a new habit. 
If Voltaire is arguing for contracts to be established, then perhaps he does not mind 
metaphysical connections at all, but wants to ensure that any commitment to a metaphysical 
principle is grounded in a place and time, is contractual and efficacious for a particular group of 
people.  Some read Voltaire as “playing for keeps” concerning God and metaphysical 
connections,240 but such a reading misunderstands the tale’s behavior. The emphasis eighteenth-
century thinkers place on “the body” and how “the body” was the chief tool of exploring “the 
void.”  
A focus on meals results in a distancing from immediate emotional sincerity. The reader 
is not caught up into the vivid emotional life of Candide, but this does not equal a loss of being.  
A loss of emotional sincerity does not coincide with a loss of being.  Emotional sincerity—like 
intellectual commitments—only come after cultivating meals.  Instead of emoting, we are taught 
to hesitate with Candide while we cultivate.  After cultivation we will be better suited to respond 
emotionally and intellectually to our context our desires will be submitted to our judgment.  By 
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 Weitz, Philosophy in Literature, 13 and 16. Weitz writes: “It is plot the plot, of Candide, not the 
characterization or the dialogue that carries the acknowledged major philosophical theme of the novel: that optimism 
is absurd.” Weitz continues his analysis and says that by making these claims, Voltaire is “playing for keeps” in his 
critique of God’s presence and the nature of evil (16). 
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focusing on meals, Candide learns to fit his emotions to his world, to understand other people 
and help them attain their fulfillment. In Candide, the characters learn how to perform Love. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Blah, blah, blah. 
-Tritical 
 
A Sign full of Absence 
Introduction 
 Here, we will move to discuss the implication of the eighteenth century’s focus on 
limitation and the human body. The implication is that, under these circumstances, the proper 
study of science became the human nature that studied Nature. The study of limitation led to the 
proper study of humanity: humanity itself. This is to say, the focus on the limitation of human 
knowledge and the human body leads Candide to ask the only truly existential question: “Why 
does anything exist?” The obsession with “the void” and how the human body explored this void 
led quite easily to a question the answer to which must necessarily lie outside the limit of human 
existence—an answer that must come from “the void” itself. 
 Additionally, at the end of this Chapter, I will conclude the thesis by summarizing my 
findings. These findings are basically that Candide confesses its readers by revealing each 
reader’s testimony. This eisegesis is scientifically helpful when one’s goal is integrity rather than 
proof. The eighteenth century used the body and its testimony to explore “the void.” The body 
became the measure for this exploration and, as a result, the questions that rise out of bodily 
experience (example: “Why does anything exist?”) were the proper study of humanity. Our 
response to this question—whether we answer it or deny it—reveals our own willful 
commitments to perceived good. Candide teaches us that our appetites determine how we use 
our judgment. Likewise, our judgments can determine how we use our desire. By exploring the 
relationship between abstract principles and the human body, eighteenth-century satire served 
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science responsibly by revealing the integrity of the scientist’s position in relation to her object 
of analysis. 
 
Signifying Absence  
While the physical garden might be destroyed or “decay” with some new, violent force, 
as long as the characters continue practicing the habit of work, they will always be cultivating 
gardens anywhere they go.  The security of the garden is actually not the physical space at all.  
The garden is the habit of cultivation, and cultivation makes the garden possible.  The garden is a 
result of and is itself the habit of work.241  Digging in the mud, over time, will create a garden. 
The garden at the end of Candide will be destroyed, but the garden does not prove anything 
anyway.  The habit of work is what creates the garden.  The commitment to work is the only 
proof that this is the best of all possible worlds, but committing to work also admits that this 
world is not yet its best. 
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 Robert M. Adams, “Candide on Work and Candide as Outsider,” Candide: The Norton Critical Edition 
(New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 165. Adams writes that Candide’s work is not a product but is a 
process. He writes that there is no positive content to Candide’s labor. The work of cultivating a garden is a 
negation; “cultivation” is an avoidance of the three evils that corrupt human life: vice, poverty and boredom (168). 
Unfortunately, Adams does not see this negation as an apophatic utterance about humanity’s place on earth. For 
him, the characters are reduced to “mechanism” (170).   
But this claim that the character have been reduced to mechanisms leaves out the possibility for a process 
to actually attain a “positive content.” But this is what Candide does. He hesitates to commit to a position, but lets 
his body develop the possibility for his holding a commitment. The reverse-mode is a negative commitment. The 
reverse-mode is a commitment to process, but this commitment is not a reduction. This “negativity” is important as 
we think about Leibniz: 
Frederick Copleston, “Leibniz (4),” A History of Philosophy IV: Modern Philosophy from Descartes to 
Leibniz (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 326. “God, according to Leibniz, always acts for the best, so that the world 
must be the best of all possible worlds. Absolutely speaking, God could have created a different world, but, morally 
speaking, He could create only the best possible world. This is the metaphysical optimism of Leibniz […] And, 
given this optimistic position, it is clearly incumbent on Leibniz to explain how it is that the evil in the world does 
not constitute its refutation.” Copleston continues his discussion by pointing out that, “By saying that the world is 
the best of all possible worlds Leibniz did not mean to imply that it has at any given moment attained its maximum 
state of perfection: it is constantly progressing and developing” (331). Voltaire has Candide hesitate with respect to 
committing to an explanation of the world’s evil. Candide commits to a habit of cultivation. In this habit, Candide 
attempts to adjust his life so as to limit evil. As he limits evil, he participates in making the world he exists in “the 
best” one possible. It is a mistake to see Candide’s hesitation as a denial of metaphysical connections. The habits we 
adopt shape both the world and our minds. We cannot judge the world without affirming the appetitive goodness we 
perceive in it. 
101 
As long as the characters continue cultivating, they will have food.  If they have food, 
they will have hope.  If they have hope, they will believe it is the best of all possible worlds. In a 
way, the habit of work is a sign full of absence. Although it is not there yet, the habit of 
cultivation demarcates where the garden will reveal itself. The public performance of their labor 
becomes a sign of the absent garden, but, because they work, the sign becomes “full” of its 
absence. Over time the garden will arrive as promised and as hoped for. They cultivate what they 
do not yet have: a garden.  But it is only this cultivation—the habit of work—that will create a 
garden at all. In this progressive reach into the future, we see how the eighteenth century mind 
sought limits and used the body to search beyond these limits. The hesitation to agree with 
Pangloss or with Martin does not mean Candide does not know anything. He knows the power of 
performing a habit. 
 
Candide’s Existential Question 
Candide works, but he does not demand that this work have ultimate meaning yet. He 
hesitates to claim that his work is either “for the best” or “a complete waste of time.” He just 
works. Candide’s work affirms the connection that all his experiences have affirmed: meals are 
good even if he does not have an answer to his questions. But, in the reverse-mode, habits 
influence concepts. He does not know yet, but that is not a problem as long as he works. As he 
works, his ideas will develop just as his body develops a garden out of the disordered void of the 
countryside. Candide’s body brings rationality to his world. He reaches the limit of his 
knowledge and there he focuses on the performance of a habit. His body will answer his 
epistemological questions. 
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One such question sticks out dramatically from the text: In one of the many superfluous 
discussions that pepper the tale, Candide asks his pessimistic travel partner: “Why […] was this 
world formed at all?” Martin responds with his insightful answer: “To drive us mad.”242 The 
question-and-answer sequence between Candide and Martin opens the text to an investigation, 
which makes most modern scholars nervous. This question (“Why does anything exist?” or 
“Why was anything created?”) is the only truly existential question243 because it asks after the 
nature of human existence itself. The question asks about what it means for a human to be 
“mad,” sane or healthy. This question is really a question about happiness. The question admits 
that the intellect—both the body and the mind—does not exist in the world peacefully. There is a 
problem of pain; humans are frustrated. Like “work,” Candide’s question is full of absence. To 
ask after existence is to begin an inquiry that leads one into the void of the world and the void of 
one’s self: “[The] question ‘Why anything?’ confronts reason as a question about the esse of 
creatures, about that which is most fundamental to them as their ‘actuality’, their standing over 
against there being nothing at all. And it is there, in their deepest reality, that creatures reveal the 
Creator who has brought them to be, ex nihilo, so that as the question gets closer and closer to 
God, it gets deeper and deeper into, not further distance from, the creature.”244 In asking 
questions about the nature of human rationality, Candide and Martin begin an investigation that 
explores “the void” but does so through the intimacy of their own bodies. In the deepest intimacy 
of their failed desire, Candide and company must discover what failure teaches them about the 
world. The answer to their dilemma is wrapped up in the definition we give to human nature. 
Defined according to Locke and Aquinas, a rational judgment about the world is an appetitive act 
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of will. Objective judgments about “the void” reveal, intimately, the subjectivity of the person 
judging. To discuss the void, we must discuss the human body. In discussing the nature of the 
human body we discuss the nature of the void. 
The similarity between Locke and Thomas Aquinas has already been touched upon with 
respect to volition. To add to this relationship, both thinkers emphasize that a human’s existence 
implies an Existence that is its own cause. This is to say, human rationality’s proper object is 
“being.” Copleston scratches his head as he points out that Locke left his arguments for God’s 
existence woefully underdeveloped (unlike Thomas Aquinas, of course).245  
Interest in “integrity” seems to be the difference between Aquinas and Locke: Although 
Locke aligns himself with Aquinas and Aristotle in connecting judgment to volition, he does not 
use his judgment to investigate “Being.” Instead he focuses on showing how “integrity” and 
testimony contribute to the consenting process.  
Like Locke, Candide explores the meaning of being by focusing on bodily violence and 
unfulfilled hungers. But in Candide, as in Locke, the exploration begins with the body. Locke 
focuses attention on how, to have any idea in our heads at all, we must be acted upon. We must 
experience something to have a concept of it; we know things when they act upon us.246 It is the 
body that develops the question, “Why was this world created?” And so Candide helps us 
understand Locke’s odd behavior at leaving his arguments underdeveloped: Affirming the 
question “Why does anything exist?” takes as its “proper study” humankind. Candide, like 
Locke’s Essay, limits itself to articulate “how it is” to exist, or “to be” rather than prove what 
that existence means. The Essay and Candide are performances that show how human life is. 
This performance, like all performances, must be investigated: “What is the motive for this 
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action,” the reader asks. This question can be answered any way a critic wants to answer it. But 
whatever the critic does with the question reveals that critic’s awareness of her “being”—that is, 
in reading, the critic must give her own testimony. The process of consent begins with testimony 
and the particular human body that embodies that testimony.247  
Contemporary atheists will completely deny the question “Why does anything exist?” 
The idea is that we do exist, so be quiet and endure it.  An atheist will affirm a belief that we 
should limit ourselves to question that “can” be answered.  But if what atheists deny to reason “is 
the possibility of an enquiry which takes us beyond anything the best science asks about, then 
[atheists] betray their own scientific calling, and something fundamental to being human, that is 
to say, to what is ‘rational,’ is denied in the process.”248 The question Candide asks Martin 
demands that we consider what “human nature” is and how humans reach happiness. Candide’s 
question and his “dark” hesitation do not break metaphysical connections. The conflict of 
Candide’s desire with his world might demand an expressible but ultimately unknowable 
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 Copleston, “Locke (4),” 140. For example, Locke’s pursuit of testimony, instead of “proof,” infects his 
political theories with a “metaphorical” defect. There is nothing in them that endures though time; while being of 
great historical importance. His theory of “consent” is very dated and so radically historic as to be useless (138). 
Copleston writes: “[W]e may also note Locke’s failure to give any thorough analysis of the concept of the common 
good. He tends to assume without more ado that the preservation of private property and the promotion of the 
common good are to all intents and purposes synonymous terms” (139). He continues, “[I]t does not follow that 
even within the framework of his own historical circumstances Locke could not have given a more adequate account 
of the function of political society and of government. There is something wanting from his account which was 
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society. That government, he writes, should promote the common good was as important in Locke’s day as it was in 
Thomas Aquinas’ (139). But again, in Locke’s “vagueness,” we can see his desire to affirm something other than an 
analytic sense of what a rational individual ought to consent to. 
Locke advances a concept whose metaphorical nature troubles philosophy, but it is precisely metaphor that 
encourages (like poetry) the reader to add her experiences to the meaning of the text. In this, the “weakness” of 
metaphor becomes strength: Vague metaphors like consent and cultivation reveal the testimonies of those who 
engage them. Once a testimony is revealed, the integrity of that testimony can be challenged. This is the aim of 
eighteenth-century satire, which advances ambiguity and “meaninglessness,” but which still has a “tonal harmony” 
with science.  
Ultimately, the precision of science and the mystery of metaphor have parted company in modernity. In this 
Kierkegaard is right: the path turns to the side; we can proceed to truths that have no regard to the individual and 
grasp an analytic sense of what reason dictates, or we can turn away and investigate the testimony and integrity 
inherent in subjectivity. 
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Metaphysical Object. Or, said in another way, “If ideas are rooted in our human animality, 
reason (and its ideas) can open up, in its own kind, into the mystery which lies unutterably 
beyond it, for it can, out of fidelity to its own native impulse, ask the question which it knows it 
could not answer, the asking being within its powers, the answering being in principle beyond 
them.”249   
What is a human’s native impulse? Is Candide at his most human when he asks, “Why 
does anything exist,” or is he at his most imbecilic? How we answer this question is a testimony 
of how we choose to use our rationality, of how we decide to judge the world. The question 
“Why does anything exist” analyzes the human system itself. Yet this “human” question also 
leaves itself open to an answer that could come from “beyond” the human system.  
 
Conclusion and Summary 
When the proper study of humankind is humanity, we can see how “believing to know” 
cultivates faithful certainty just as “knowing to believe” cultivates modern doubt. It is the work 
of satire to force the reader-critic into revealing where she stands as a human being in relation to 
the meaning of the final metaphor (“cultivation”). In the satiric world, the text will force each 
reader to reveal his or her commitments and in the process of engaging other readers, the 
integrity of our own perspectives will be challenged. Each of us proceeds as we will, but our 
“judgment” serves whatever we will. 
  As we have seen, Candide serves science by drawing out testimony. Eisegesis serves 
science when that science assumes volition and judgment are interconnected. When volition and 
judgment influence one another, “integrity” is as important as “proof,” for we only prove what 
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we perceive as good. In this interplay between desire and judgment we can see how the 
eighteenth-century scientist used the human body to explore “the void.” The human body 
became the chief tool in measuring the void, in exploring and in discovering what kind of world 
this is. 
The emphasis on the body can be called a “reverse-mode” of explanation because the 
body’s habits influence the mind’s judgments. Locke offers us an example of this mode while 
Candide serves to teach us what this mode looks like. Satire, like Candide, serves science’s void-
entering investigations by revealing that our responses to this question—whether we answer it or 
deny it—reveals our own willful commitments to pursue perceived good. In this way, satire 
helps reveal the integrity of a scientist’s position in relation to her object of analysis. 
Rather than demand an answer to this question, Candide affirms a metaphor of performance: 
Cultivation.  
Specifically, as we saw in Chapter Four, Candide’s meals become examples of the 
reverse-mode and “hesitation.” The reverse-mode and hesitation help us balance our lives and fit 
our bodies to the concepts we believe. As we read the story and interpret, we are forced to see 
these interpretations are affirmations of what we each perceive to be good. Because of different 
understandings of what “human nature” is and the different goods we can “move towards,” 
Candide has cultivated a diverse body of criticism. In engaging Candide, we must engage 
Rousseau and the influence his thought has had on current definitions of “human nature.” 
The emphasis on the body naturally gives rise to the body’s basic question: “If I am 
finite, yet exist, what caused my existence?” This question—a question that rises naturally out of 
bodily experience—was the proper study of humanity in the eighteenth century. To understand 
“the void” a scientist had to understand the body’s experience of that void. To pursue greater 
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levels of objectivity, the body’s place in relation to objectivity had to be accounted for. Integrity 
of research was as important as the research itself. As a result enactment and habits were 
essential elements in the discovery of truth. The body explored, discovered and cultivated the 
truths the intellect grasped. Love was a performance in the face of the void; life was a question 
that the void answered even if the answer was apophatic.  
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